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It is well known that Dr. Moynihan is not a Republican. But it is especially proper for Republicans to salute Dr. Moynihan for the way he acts in the spirit of Abraham Lincoln.

He does this in two ways.

First, he is devoting much of his life to helping realize the great American dream—the dream of a harmonious multiracial republic.

Second, in working for that goal, Dr. Moynihan is faithful to the words of Lincoln, who said:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy, stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves.

All Dr. Moynihan is asking is that we disenthral ourselves from the dogmas of the past. As Dr. Moynihan understands, our future will be less stormy if our thinking is less dogmatic.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, Dr. Moynihan's memorandum and an editorial on the subject.

There being no objection the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 1, 1970]  
TEXT OF THE MOYNIHAN MEMORANDUM ON THE STATUS OF NEGROES

As the new year begins, it occurs to me that you might find useful a general assessment of the position of Negroes at the end of the first year of your Administration, and of the decade in which their position has been the central domestic political issue.

In quantitative terms, which are reliable, the American Negro is making extraordinary progress. In political terms, somewhat less reliable, this would also appear to be true. In each case, however, there would seem to be countercurrents that pose a serious threat to the welfare of the blacks and the stability of the society, white and black.

## 1. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

The nineteen-sixties saw the great breakthrough for blacks. A third (32 per cent) of all families of Negro and other races earned \$8,000 or more in 1968 compared, in constant dollars, with 15 per cent in 1960.

The South is still a problem. Slightly more than half (52 per cent) of the Negro population lived in the South in 1969. There, only 19 per cent of families of Negro and other races earned over \$8,000.

Young Negro families are achieving income parity with young white families. Outside the South, young husband-wife Negro families have 99 per cent of the income of whites! For families headed by a male age 25 to 34, the proportion was 87 per cent. Thus, it may be this ancient gap is finally closing.

Income reflects employment, and this changed dramatically in the nineteen-sixties. Blacks continued to have twice the unemployment rates of whites, but these were down for both groups. In 1969, the rate for married men of Negro and other races was only 2.5 per cent. Teen-agers, on the other hand, continued their appalling rates: 24.4 per cent in 1969.

Black occupations improved dramatically. The number of professional and technical employees doubled in the period 1960-68. This was two and a half times the increase for whites. In 1969, Negro and other races provided 10 per cent of the other-than-college teachers. This is roughly their proportion of the population (11 per cent).

## 2. EDUCATION

In 1968, 19 per cent of Negro children 3 and 4 years old were enrolled in school, com-

pared to 15 per cent of white children. Forty-five per cent of Negroes 18 and 19 years old were in school, almost the equal of the white proportion of 51 per cent. Negro college enrollment rose 85 per cent between 1964 and 1968, by which time there were 434,000 Negro college students. (The total full-time university population of Great Britain is 200,000.)

Educational achievement should not be exaggerated. Only 16 per cent of Negro high school seniors have verbal test scores at or above grade level. But blacks are staying in school.

## 3. FEMALE-HEADED FAMILIES

This problem does not get better, it gets worse. In 1969, the proportion of husband-wife families of Negro and other races declined once again, this time to 68.7 per cent. The illegitimacy ratio rose once again, this time to 29.4 per cent of all live births. (The white ratio rose more sharply, but was still only 19 per cent.)

Increasingly, the problem of Negro poverty is the problem of the female-headed family. In 1968, 56 per cent of Negro families with income under \$3,000 were female-headed. In 1968, for the first time, the number of poor Negro children in female-headed families (2,241,000) was greater than the number in male-headed families (1,947,000).

## 4. SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

The incidence of anti-social behavior among young black males continues to be extraordinarily high. Apart from white racial attitudes, this is the biggest problem black Americans face, and in part it helps shape white racial attitudes. Black Americans injure one another. Because blacks live in de facto segregated neighborhoods and go to de facto segregated schools, the socially stable elements of the black population cannot escape the socially pathological ones. Routinely, their children get caught up in the antisocial patterns of the others.

You are familiar with the problems of crime. Let me draw your attention to another phenomenon, exactly parallel, and originating in exactly the same social circumstances: Fire. Unless I mistake the trends, we are heading for a genuinely serious fire problem in American cities. In New York, for example, between 1956 and 1969 the over-all fire alarm rate more than tripled, from 69,000 alarms to 240,000. These alarms are concentrated in slum neighborhoods, primarily black. In 1968, one slum area had an alarm rate per square mile 13 times that of the city as a whole. In another, the number of alarms has, on an average, increased 44 per cent per year for seven years.

Many of these fires are the result of population density. But a great many are more or less deliberately set. (Thus, on Monday, welfare protectors set two fires in the New York State Capitol.) Fires are in fact a "leading indicator" of social pathology for a neighborhood. They come first. Crime, and the rest, follows. The psychiatric interpretation of fire-setting is complex, but it relates to the types of personalities which slums produce. (A point of possible interest: Fires in the black slums peak in July and August. The urban riots of 1964-1968 could be thought of as epidemic conditions of an endemic situation.)

## 5. SOCIAL ALIENATION

With no real evidence, I would nonetheless suggest that a great deal of the crime, the fire-setting, the rampant school violence and other such phenomenon in the black community have become quasi-politicized. Hatred—revenge—against whites is now an acceptable excuse for doing what might have been done anyway. This is bad news for any society, especially when it takes forms which the Black Panthers seem to have adopted.

This social alienation among the black lower classes is matched and probably en-

hanced, by a virulent form of anti-white feeling among portions of the large and prosperous black middle class. It would be difficult to overestimate the degree to which young, well-educated blacks detest white America.

## 6. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

As you have candidly acknowledged, the relation of the Administration to the black population is a problem. I think it ought also to be acknowledged that we are a long way from solving it. During the past year, intense efforts have been made by the Administration to develop programs that will be of help to the blacks. I dare say, as much or more time and attention goes into this effort in this Administration than any in history. But little has come of it. There has been a great deal of political ineptness in some departments, and you have been the loser.

I don't know what you can do about this. Perhaps nothing. But I do have four suggestions.

First. Sometime early in the year, I would gather together the Administration officials who are most involved with these matters and talk out the subject a bit. There really is a need for a more coherent Administration approach to a number of issues. (Which I can list for you, if you like.)

Second. The time may have come when the issue of race could benefit from a period of "benign neglect." The subject has been too much talked about. The forum has been too much taken over to hysterics, paranoids and boozers on all sides. We may need a period in which Negro progress continues and racial rhetoric fades. The Administration can help bring this about by paying close attention to such progress—as we are doing—while seeking to avoid situations in which extremists of either race are given opportunities for martyrdom, heroics, histrionics or whatever. Greater attention to Indians, Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans would be useful.

A tendency to ignore provocations from groups such as the Black Panthers might also be useful. (The Panthers were apparently almost defunct until the Chicago police raided one of their headquarters and transformed them into culture heroes for the white—and black—middle class. You perhaps did not note on the society page of yesterday's Times that Mrs. Leonard Bernstein gave a cocktail party on Wednesday to raise money for the Panthers. Mrs. W. Vincent Aston was among the guests. Mrs. Peter Duchin, "the rich blonde wife of the orchestra leader," was thrilled "I've never met a Panther," she said. "This is a first for me.")

Third. We really ought to be getting on with research on crime. We just don't know enough. It is a year now since the Administration came to office committed to doing something about crime in the streets. But frankly, in that year I don't see that we have advanced either our understanding of the problem, or that of the public at large. (This of course may only reveal my ignorance of what is going on.)

At the risk of indiscretion, may I put it that lawyers are not professionally well equipped to do much to prevent crime. Lawyers are not managers, and they are not researchers. The logistics, the ecology, the strategy and tactics of reducing the incidence of certain types of behavior in large urban populations simply are not things lawyers think about often.

We are never going to "learn" about crime in a laboratory sense. But we almost certainly could profit from limited, carefully done studies. I don't think these will be done unless you express a personal interest.

Fourth. There is a silent black majority as well as a white one. It is mostly working class, as against lower middle class. It is politically moderate (on issues other than racial equality) and shares most of the con-

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terms of its white counterpart. This group has been generally ignored by the Government and the media. The more recognition we can give to it, the better off we shall all be. (I would take it, for example, that Ambassador [Jerome H.] Holland is a natural leader of this segment of the black community. There are others like him.)

[From the Evening Star, Mar. 3, 1970]

## THE MOYNIHAN MEMORANDUM

It is not exactly clear how the private communication between Daniel P. Moynihan and President Nixon on the status of Negroes in American society wound up in the public domain. Somehow it came into the possession of a newspaper, which decided that the document constituted news fit to print—and that was that.

It can, however, be deduced that, whoever was responsible, it wasn't Moynihan. At a press conference following publication, Moynihan was obviously steaming. Had he known, he said, that the document was going to be "stolen or borrowed or leaked" he would have taken the trouble to explain that term "benign neglect" in its historical context.

Moynihan's anger is understandable. No one likes to think that his private correspondence—even a note to the President—is subject to national distribution. Besides, it is probable that had Moynihan been writing for publication, the prose would have been somewhat more polished. The document was only about 100 percent above the average literary quality of governmental prose, instead of the 200 or 300 percent one has come to expect of Moynihan.

But there is nothing in the substance of the memorandum to distress anyone, including the author. The term "benign neglect"—in or out of its historical context—is perhaps not outstandingly felicitous. The problems of race should not truly be neglected by any administration, benignly or otherwise. The memo made that fact clear by its statistical catalogue of continuing Negro problems. But the thrust of Moynihan's argument—that this society might benefit from a relaxation of its fixation on the problems of race—is a suitable topic for intra-governmental discussion.

There is considerable food for thought in Moynihan's contention that the total society would benefit from a studied disregard of the more paranoid elements of the black activist movement and the fanatic white supremacists. And it is hard to fault his thesis that progress toward full equality for all races would be accelerated if those who yell the loudest about race would shut up.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the memo was its typical Moynihanian disdain of euphemism. It is a trait that has ruffled feathers on a number of previous occasions. But whether or not one agrees with all of Moynihan's conclusions, it is good to know that the President has men about him who call the shots as they see them, and that he encourages them to pass their uncosmetized opinions directly to him.

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## NEGOTIATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Philadelphia Bulletin of February 22 contains an interesting article by former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman concerning North Vietnam's and the NLF's negotiating position and the prospects for peace in Vietnam.

According to Mr. Hilsman, recent signals seem to add up to the following offer:

No election, but an old-fashioned political deal setting up a coalition government including representatives of all political

factions, Communist and non-Communist; Although their propaganda still calls for immediate total withdrawal of American troops, privately they have indicated the withdrawal could be phased over two or three years;

Postponement of the reunification of North and South Vietnam for a period of between five and ten years;

International guarantees of the territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia.

This analysis bears out recent similar reports from other sources and, if correct, presents the administration with an opportunity and a challenge to initiate serious negotiations in Paris. There have been all too many chances for peace ignored or rejected during the history of this tragic war.

Mr. Hilsman concludes the article with this warning:

And if the professional Communist-watchers are right in believing that the Communists are offering an acceptable deal, his (President Nixon's) rejection of their proposal may be as tragic as the decision to make Vietnam an American war in the first place.

Mr. Hilsman's analysis of North Vietnam's and the NLF's current posture is similar to that put forward in early February by Dr. Leslie Gelb, a former high official of the Defense Department, presently with the Brookings Institution.

In a letter to the editor appearing in the New York Times on February 1, Dr. Gelb also expressed the belief that Hanoi and the NLF had put forward a new negotiating position. After analyzing the new position, Dr. Gelb went on to suggest how it might provide an opening for a comprehensive new American proposal dealing with troop withdrawals, direct political talks between Saigon, Hanoi, and the NLF, and the return of American prisoners of war.

Dr. Gelb pointed out that his proposal was consistent with the President's past positions on Vietnam. He concluded his letter with this observation, in which I concur:

We should not consider the Paris peace talks a forgotten chapter of the war. President Nixon's objective of free self-determination and Hanoi's objective of full U.S. withdrawal are not mutually exclusive.

If there is any possibility that something might come of an exploration of the viewpoints suggested by Mr. Hilsman and Dr. Gelb, such an effort is well worth making. If Hanoi and the NLF do not respond favorably we will have lost nothing. On the other hand, there could be no greater tragedy than passing up an opportunity to end the war.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Hilsman's article, Dr. Gelb's letter and an accompanying New York Times editorial be placed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Philadelphia (Pa.) Bulletin Feb. 22, 1970]

## NIXON APPEARS TO BE REBUFFING RED OFFER OF PEACE IN VIETNAM

(By Roger Hilsman)

(NOTE.—The author of this article is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and is presently professor of government at Columbia University.)

New York—President Nixon is rebuffing a Communist offer of a more-or-less immediate Vietnam peace on terms that many Americans might find perfectly acceptable.

This is the puzzling, and unhappy, conclusion I have reached after private contacts with North Vietnamese diplomats and after studying both public and private signals which the Communists have been sending out in recent months.

Other Communist watchers, including W. Averell Harriman, the former American peace negotiator in Paris, have come to the same conclusion.

## WITHDRAWALS SCHEDULED

Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence that "Vietnamization" of the war is going forward at a much slower pace than is generally expected and believed.

The best information in Washington is that President Nixon plans to reduce American forces in Vietnam very gradually in 1970 to about 280,000 to 300,000 men. Then, in 1971, he plans only a relatively small further reduction to about 250,000 men.

In 1972, the election year, he will bring home another 50,000 to 75,000 men, and just before the election he can announce a decision to withdraw another 50,000 to 75,000.

## SHREWD POLITICS

This is shrewd politics, but the consequences are great. The monetary cost of the war under Nixon program will be high—something between \$50 and \$100 billion. Much more important, however, is the foreseeable cost of the program in American lives.

Although the President's plan will mean a reduction in casualties, we can expect another 5,000 to 10,000 Americans to be killed in the three-year period. And it might be many more than that.

For the fact is that the Nixon plan is a decision to continue the war in Vietnam, not to end it. When all the reductions he is reportedly planning have been made, there will still be between 100,000 and 150,000 American troops in Vietnam.

## NOT THE ONLY WAY

And this means that, although it may not come for a year or even two, eventually the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong will be forced into launching a major offensive aimed directly at the Americans.

This snail's-space Vietnamization is not the only course available to Mr. Nixon. For more than a year, the Communist side has been sending what the Communist-watchers call signals. Sometimes these signals are direct and straightforward, but private—put out, for example, not officially, but in one of the "tea-break" conversations of the Paris negotiations. Others are contained in subtleties of language that laymen find confusing, but which are meaningful to professional Communist-type watchers.

An example is the letter from the late Ho Chi Minh to President Nixon written just before Ho's death last September. In the past, Communist practice had been to describe the so-called "ten points" of the NLF peace proposal as the only possible solution.

## SHIFT NO ACCIDENT

But, in his letter, Ho refers to them as "a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem." If past experience with the Communists is any guide, the shift from "the" to "a" and from words like "only possible solution" to "basis for a settlement," is not accidental.

In the opinion of a number of professional Communist-watchers, what these signals add up to is the following offer:

—No election, but an old-fashioned political deal setting up a coalition government including representatives of all political factions, Communist and non-Communist;

—Although their propaganda still calls for immediate total withdrawal of American forces, privately they have indicated the

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withdrawal could be phased over two or three years;

## CAMBODIA'S INTEGRITY

—Postponement of the reunification of North and South Vietnam for a period of between five and ten years;

—International guarantees of the territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia.

"One interesting point is that the Communist side told Harriman, when he was chief negotiator in Paris, that after the war was over, they would like to exchange ambassadors with Western nations, including the United States.

Pointing to the fact that they have friendly relations with the French in spite of their long struggle for independence, they said that they would like to do the same with the United States.

What is particularly unusual is how far the Communist side has gone in their public signals, making concessions that for reasons of negotiating tactics they would normally reserve for later use.

The most startling of all was the public statement by the Paris representative of the NLF, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, on November 14. The NLF has refused to do business with the Thieu-Ky government, and everyone in Washington supposed they would deal only with some pliable pro-Communist.

But Mrs. Binh stated that if General "Big" Minh became the head of a peace cabinet in Saigon, "we are ready to begin conversations with him." Although "Big" Minh has hinted that he is willing to negotiate with the Communists, he is certainly neither pro-Communist nor a dove. On the contrary, he is the most senior and popular general in the South Vietnamese army, and the leader of the 1963 coup against the hated Diem regime.

## WILLINGNESS TO DEAL

A willingness to deal with Minh is an extraordinary concession, since he could form a non-Communist government far more representative and popular than the present Thieu-Ky government, and hence one that would carry much more weight in negotiations and in any coalition government that followed.

Although there is some difference of opinion about the exact nature of the coalition government the Communists are proposing, there is no doubt that they are offering a deal.

Harriman, the most prestigious Communist-watcher of them all, is convinced that if President Johnson had accepted the advice given him in the summer of 1968, a peace settlement could have been achieved as early as September, 1968. And he thinks Mr. Nixon has the same sort of opportunity.

## INTERESTING POINT

The interesting point is why the Communist side is offering such a deal.

It is very doubtful that Hanoi and the NLF have decided they won't win. Although they may be poorly informed on some aspects of American politics and excessively suspicious, there is reason to believe that they can read the political signs in the United States well enough to know that President Nixon will find it impossible to return to a policy of escalation in Vietnam and that even keeping American air and artillery forces there may become politically difficult for him.

In the second place, there is no reason to believe either that the Communist side doubts that they will prevail over the Saigon government once the United States departs or that they are wrong in that judgment.

## WASHINGTON OPTIMISM

Currently there is an upsurge of optimism in Washington about the ability of the Vietnamese to fend for themselves because the statistical indicators are favorable. The trouble is that the gains highlighted by the statistical indicators are very fragile, and most of them have been possible only because

the North Vietnamese forces have pulled back for the political purposes of signalling a willingness to negotiate and in response to Mr. Nixon's reduction of American troops.

The North Vietnamese can dramatically reverse all these indicators by a decision to launch an offensive, or less dramatically by a decision to attack the pacification effort itself.

So why are Hanoi and the NLF so interested in a settlement based on a coalition government, if things will eventually go their way no matter what? Why don't they simply settle down themselves to a long-haul, low-cost war? I think it is because of Communist China.

## THEY'RE DETERMINED

Hanoi has so far maintained its independence of China, even to the extent of going to Paris for the negotiations against Chinese advice and in the face of some very concrete measures of a punitive nature that China took against them. And it seems perfectly clear that the North Vietnamese are fiercely determined to continue to maintain their independence.

If the motive for their signals is related to their fear of China, this would explain a number of things.

In the first place, a negotiated settlement, formally signed by 13 or 14 signatories (depending on whether China does or does not sign) would act as a potent political deterrent to China whether or not its provisions include teeth in the form of international police forces or the like.

The Chinese have other goals than Vietnam, and they are political enough to understand the consequences for those other goals of a blatant violation of an agreement signed by so many of the world's powers, both Communist and non-Communist.

## A WESTERN STAKE

Second, if North Vietnam maintained friendly relations with Western powers it would provide a Western stake in Vietnam and a Western presence there that would also act as a deterrent to China. A phased withdrawal of American troops would make the point even more dramatically, and a postponed reunification would be both a concession and a way of providing time for healing wounds and thus eventually presenting both China and the world with a Vietnam that is more truly united.

And if the motive is China, there are also several implications that are important to the United States. It means, for example, that there is little basis for Mr. Nixon's fear of a blood bath following the installation of a coalition government—a fear that was the foundation stone of the Vietnamization policy laid down in his November 3 speech.

If the Communist side does in the end become dominant in a coalition government, some individuals will undoubtedly be tried as war criminals—such as the secret police chief who shot a suspect in front of an American camera.

## SETTLE OLD SCORES

Also, in some villages, where conditions are chaotic, there will undoubtedly be individuals, both Communist and non-Communist, who will take the opportunity to settle old scores.

But if the Communists want to maintain their independence of China, they will not want a blood bath but a reconciliation. For if China is a problem, they will need to develop support among non-Communist elements of the population as well as Communist.

For the same reason, the Vietnamese Communists have a stake in maintaining the sympathies of the outside world, non-Communist as well as Communist, which any sort of blood bath would jeopardize—and certainly so if Western ambassadors were present in the country. For all these reasons

it seems likely that the official policy will be one of no reprisals.

## WHAT PROFESSORS SAID

The expectations of Vietnamese who would be prime targets of any reprisal are instructive. Last year I asked 12 different non-Communist or anti-Communist Vietnamese professors and university officials what they would do if the Paris negotiations resulted in a coalition government and sessions of self-\* \* \* communist-dominated—would they go to Paris? To the United States? Each one answered that he expected not only to remain in Vietnam but to continue in his university post.

"But what about reprisals?" I would ask in some amazement.

"Oh," the reply went, "there will be some harassment and sessions of self-criticism. But I expect to go on teaching, and to draw my salary."

What all this suggests is that although one may not be inclined to trust what the Communists are saying, there seems to be solid political pressure on them on which one can rely. It is these pressures which lead them to want a settlement rather than simply to wait for Vietnam to fall in their laps.

## NUMBER OF MISGIVINGS

As for the Nixon policy of Vietnamization, experienced observers have a number of misgivings. The most important is doubt that it will work. It hardly seems realistic to believe that Saigon can prevail against the combined strength of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese alone.

## WE SHOULD ASK

Admittedly, it might turn out that in spite of their signals, what the Communist side has in mind for a coalition government is unacceptable.

If so, the Nixon policy may be a better policy than the other possibilities. But the point is that we will never know if we don't take at least the first step—that of asking the Communist side in Paris to be specific.

It is this that Mr. Nixon refuses to do. And if the professional Communist-watchers are right in believing that the Communists are offering an acceptable deal, his rejection of their proposal may be as tragic as the decision to make Vietnam an American war in the first place.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 1, 1970]

## HANOI'S TERMS AT PARIS PEACE TALKS

## To the EDITOR:

Since last May, two "legitimate demands" have constituted the core of Hanoi's terms for settling the war: (1) The "total and unconditional" withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces, and (2) the formation of a provisional coalition government made possible, in effect, by U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations at Paris. In sum, we were supposed both to make a commitment to get out and to dump the Thieu-Ky regime.

In September, Hanoi hinted at a shift. Their negotiators stated in Paris that acceleration of U.S. withdrawals would be "taken into account," and when quizzed about the reduced level of military activity in South Vietnam, they said that "it speaks for itself." At about this same time, U.S. officials observed that North Vietnamese infiltration declined, resulting in a reduction of forces approximately equal to U.S. withdrawals.

On Dec. 18, Ha Van Lau said:

"If the United States declares the total and unconditional withdrawal from South Vietnam of its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp within a six-month period, the parties will discuss the timetable of the withdrawal of these troops and the question of insuring the safety for such troop withdrawal."

In this same statement, he said that once the above requirement is fulfilled, the various

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forces for peace in Vietnam "will enter into talks to set up a provisional coalition government . . ." Seemingly Hanoi expects the latter to happen; it does not have to be negotiated at Paris.

What might all this mean?

1. For the first time Hanoi has told us how to meet the "total and unconditional withdrawal" requirement—by announcing it publicly.

2. The key to the announcement is the certainty that by a specified date all of our troops will be withdrawn.

3. While Hanoi says six months, this could be read as a bargaining gambit. Xuan Thuy said that the U.S. "must accept the principle of withdrawal, then put it into practice," and that some U.S. forces could remain in South Vietnam even as late as the elections to be conducted by the provisional coalition government.

4. Hanoi's "total and unconditional" phrase remains, raising the question as to what we might get in return for our withdrawal announcement. Hanoi backed away from this same phrase in October, 1968. When we stopped the bombing, Hanoi accepted the condition that the Government of South Vietnam be seated in Paris along with the National Liberation Front as part of a you-side-our-side arrangement. We also assumed and had reason to believe that Hanoi understood that it should "not take advantage" of our bombing cessation by shelling major cities and by abusing the DMZ. To a degree, Hanoi has lived up to our assumption of "no advantage."

This past experience is suggestive of what we could ask from Hanoi now. Politically, we might extract the condition that Hanoi and the NLF agree to talk with the Government of Vietnam about political settlement. Militarily, we could give Hanoi to understand that we expect its forces in the South to be reduced accordingly, the level of military activity to decline, and require the return of all American POW's.

This proposal is not inconsistent with President Nixon's speech of May: "Peace on paper is not as important as peace in fact."

We should not consider the Paris peace talks a forgotten chapter of the war. President Nixon's objective of free self-determination and Hanoi's objective of full U.S. withdrawal are not mutually exclusive.

LESLIE H. GELB.

ALEXANDRIA, VA., January 22, 1970.

(Note.—The writer, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, worked on the Paris negotiations.)

[From the New York Times, Feb. 1, 1970]

PARIS PEACE OPENING

A high Pentagon official of the Johnson and early Nixon Administrations, who worked on the secret Paris negotiations on Vietnam, believes the North Vietnamese may now be trying to tell the United States how to break the deadlock in the peace talks.

The shift in Hanoi's position described in today's letter to the editor from Leslie H. Gelb, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, seems to provide an opportunity for the United States to employ again a device similar to that used in 1968 to get the negotiations going in the first place. Mr. Gelb's suggestion is that the United States inform Hanoi and Moscow privately that it will publicly announce a terminal date for withdrawal of all its troops if it can also announce that it assumes and has reason to believe the other side will comply with two conditions. These are: first that Hanoi and the National Liberation Front will promptly enter into negotiations with the Saigon Government for a political settlement and second, that North Vietnam will withdraw its forces from the South at the same rate as

the U.S., further reduce the level of military activity and return all American POW's.

President Nixon last May said: "If North Vietnam wants to insist that it has no forces in South Vietnam, we will no longer debate the point—provided that its forces cease to be there, and that we have reliable assurance that they will not return."

But, while asking questions about some of Hanoi's shifts of position, the Nixon Administration has refused to make any new proposals. It insists that it has already made so many concessions that the next offer must come from the other side.

If Mr. Gelb is right, North Vietnam has now conceded several points. The return of Politburo member Le Duc Tho to Paris from Hanoi Friday makes this a strategic moment to attempt to revitalize the negotiations. Hanoi's reaction to the Gelb proposal, if it were now advanced in Paris, would quickly reveal whether this can be done.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN LAOS

MR. PELL. Mr. President, the time for candor about the deepening involvement of the United States in Laos has obviously arrived. The American people have a right to a public accounting from the administration. They have a right to an official explanation of what we are doing there and why. They have a right to know what the intentions of the administration are. They have a right to know what the actual military situation in Laos is.

Certainly there have been some alarming reports in the press. We are told that hundreds of American warplanes are providing direct air support to a guerrilla army raised and financed by the CIA. This is all taking place in and around the Plain of Jars, scores of miles from the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail where our bombing raids are said to be necessary to hinder North Vietnamese infiltration in South Vietnam.

I need not remind the Senate that our present tragic and seemingly endless involvement in South Vietnam began with intervention on a somewhat smaller scale than now seems to be the case in Laos. One clear lesson we should have drawn from Vietnam is that an increase in our own involvement leads inevitably to a similar increase by the other side. What will we do then?

We must ask ourselves just how vital are our interests in Laos and how much in lives and money we are willing to pay to preserve them. But we cannot answer these questions so long as the pertinent facts are kept behind a shield of official secrecy.

In short, Mr. President, the public and the Senate badly need a public statement of administration policy.

ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT

MR. MILLER. Mr. President, Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin, addressing the National Farm Institute in Des Moines on February 13, described the important role of agriculture in improving our environment.

The Secretary's significant address was particularly timely in that it fol-

lowed by only 2 days the far-reaching message of President Nixon on the entire subject of the environment. Secretary Hardin's response to the President's challenge to all of us to summon "our energy, our ingenuity, and our conscience in a cause as fundamental as life itself" was directly to the point.

Both the American farmer and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have been engaged for decades in practices which enrich and protect our environment.

Since the dust bowl days of the 1930's, Secretary Hardin pointed out, more than two million individual farmers, ranchers, communities, and other land users have voluntarily signed cooperative agreements to put conservation plans into effect—plans that involve three-quarters of a billion acres of land.

Yet, as the Secretary correctly observed, new technology has presented new problems affecting environmental quality. He cited the Department's determination to help solve these problems and outlined the policy objectives it is following to reach early solutions.

I believe the Secretary's speech merits the attention of all who are concerned with the agricultural aspects of environmental quality and I ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE:  
CLIFFORD M. HARDIN

It may be coincidence that we are meeting on Abraham Lincoln's birthday—but it is altogether fitting and proper. The Administration of our sixteenth President left significant marks on agriculture—for it was during those years that three lasting pieces of legislation came into being—the Morrill Act providing for the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, the Act creating the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Homestead Act. Together they set the pattern for American agriculture. The Homestead Act resulted in the settling of half a continent and placed the management of our basic soil and water resources in the hands of independent free-hold farmers.

The 19th century brought progress and it brought exploitation. The century began with a patent for the first cast iron plow; it ended with the invention of the gasoline engine and the automobile.

Today we are very much aware that our technological advances which have done so much for us and for the world also are seriously offending and polluting our environment. The alarm has been sounded, and just the day before yesterday President Nixon sent to the Congress a comprehensive 37-point program, embracing 23 major legislative proposals and 14 new measures being taken by administrative action or Executive Order.

In view of the rising public concern and against the backdrop of the President's new initiatives, it is imperative that those of us with agricultural responsibilities re-think and re-assess the special role of agriculture.

As the President said in his message, "The fight against pollution, however, is not a search for villains. For the most part, the damage done to our environment has not been the work of evil men, nor has it been the inevitable by-product either of advancing technology or of growing population. It results not so much from choices made, as from choices neglected; not from malign in-

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position. These EKG's demonstrated a lag in the pulse rise of about 6 to 10 seconds after becoming erect. A sinus tachycardia then ensued with rates, as described above. In general, the rate at the end of the 60-second erect-position period was higher by 5 to 10 than the initial phase of the tachycardia. Upon reclining, there was again a lag of 3 to 6 seconds then abrupt slowing occurred with the rate changing from 120 to 130 to 50 to 60 in the space of 5 to 10 seconds. In one case, there was a complete inhibition of the S-A node with a pair of nodal escape beats (this man had 50  $\mu$ g/kg). This phenomenon did not repeat. In addition, there was generally inversion of the T-wave in lead II during the tachycardia phase. This is probably of little significance and may be attributed to heart rate and decrease in blood pressure rather than a direct effect of the agent.

Liver-function tests (bile, alkaline phosphatase, SGOT, SGPT, TT) and BUN's, drawn at control, at 8 hours and at 24 hours showed no consistent alterations. Other observations included a decrease in tem-

perature, as measured orally. This drop in temperature occurred at 3 to 10 hours. The magnitude varied from 0.5° to 1°F at lower doses and 2°F at higher doses. The time of onset of symptoms varied from person to person; however, changes in pulse and in blood pressure were observed at 2 hours, with the peak effects on pulse and blood pressure occurring at 6 to 10 hours and even later in some cases. With the larger doses, the peak effect seemed to occur later than with the smaller doses. The major effect of the agent on the cardiovascular system was gone after 24 hours. There were drops in blood pressure and pulse rises, however, which remained for several days, although the subjects felt perfectly well and had no symptoms whatsoever. There were injection and hyperemia of the conjunctivae in all cases; this is consistent with other reports of human administration of *Cannabis*.

It should be noted that the somnolence induced by this agent had its peak after the cardiovascular effects had reached their peak. The two men who received 40  $\mu$ g/kg had the longest lethargic period and slept all night

and the day following exposures. At this time, there were changes in pulse and blood pressure, but less marked than previously and symptoms attributed to these changes, if any had occurred, had disappeared.

Objective physiological data with significant drug-induced changes are to be found in table 6.

Psychophysical decrement of drug-induced origin was assessed by numerical facility and speed of closure (Texas Battery Test), Purdue Pegboard Test, and the Stromberg Manual Dexterity Test, all tests being administered to the subjects at regularly scheduled intervals throughout the course of the experiments.

In table 7, the mean of the three highest performance scores is compared with the mean of the three lowest scores for each of the tests used. This numerical relationship of dose to psychophysical performance is expressed graphically in the following figure.

2. *Human Estimates for EA 1476, EA 2233, and Isomers.*

The oral ID50, for both EA 1476 or EA 2233, is 4 mg/70-kg man.

TABLE 6.—PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA WITH SIGNIFICANT DRUG-INDUCED CHANGES IN MAN (U)

Date	Subject	Dose, Hg/kg	Arterial blood pressure						Heart rate			Body temperature of experimental subject			
			mmHg						Time of maximum change after dose, hour	Beats per minute	Time at maximum rate	Beats per minute	°F		
			Mean change in control subject	Systolic	Diastolic	Mean change in experimental subject	Systolic	Diastolic		Mean in control subject	Mean in experimental subject	Hour	Mean	Maximum decrease	
Jan. 17, 1963	Echols	10	-3	+10	-20	+5	-45	-30	5	74	95	5	100	98.0	1.0
Jan. 15, 1963	Eget	10	+10	+5	-10	+8	-40	+5	5	78	89	5	100	98.1	0.8
Do	Butts	20	-9	+1	-24	-17	-40	-24	7	79	124	7	127	97.7	1.8
Jan. 17, 1963	Hallau	20	+11	+11	-40	0	-62	-8	5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	74	133	5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	160	99.2	2.4
Jan. 22, 1963	Hardin	20	-10	+23	-17	+16	-44	+1	18	101	100	18	120	98.5	1.9
Jan. 24, 1963	Fox	30	-10	-5	-27	-7	-50	-20	7 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	93	105	7 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	92	98.2	1.2
Do	Premus	30	-10	+15	-30	0	-60	-10	2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	78	100	2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	118	98.1	1.7
Jan. 29, 1963	Echols	40	-11	-1	-22	-10	-44	-10	5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	90	95	5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	91	97.7	2.1
Do	Eget	40	-20	-5	-32	-7	-52	-14	11	98	119	11	108	98.3	3.3
Jan. 31, 1963	Van Ness	50	-28	-6	-42	-12	-66	-26	7 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	74	103	7 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	105	98.2	2.3
Do	Watrous	50	+8	+16	-29	-13	-64	-32	5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	90	131	5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	160	98.4	3.4
Feb. 5, 1963	Warec	60	-34	-11	-32	-10	-60	-20	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	93	106	1 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	107	98.0	2.0
Do	McDonald	60	+1	+20	-27	-11	-50	-34	8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	93	104	8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	120	98.6	1.9

Note: All data on blood pressure and heart rate were obtained 60 seconds in an erect position.

TABLE 7.—A COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE SCORES IN PERCENT ON TEXAS BATTERY, PURDUE PEGBOARD, AND STROMBERG DEXTERITY TESTS OF THIRTEEN SUBJECTS (U)

Subject	Dose $\mu$ /kg.	$\bar{A}$ of three highest scores	$\bar{A}$ of three lowest scores (percent)	Difference	$\bar{A}$ difference at each dose level	Subject	Dose $\mu$ /kg.	$\bar{A}$ of three highest scores	$\bar{A}$ of three lowest scores (percent)	Difference	$\bar{A}$ difference at each dose level						
Texas battery test:																	
Echols	10	112	95	17	16	Eget <sup>1</sup>	40	102	82	20	22						
Eget	10	103	89	14	—	Echols <sup>1</sup>	40	103	80	23	—						
Hardin	20	113	101	12	11	Watrous	50	101	75	26	25						
Hallau	20	107	91	16	—	Van Ness	50	108	84	24	—						
Butts	20	113	107	6	—	McDonald	60	100	77	23	21						
Premus	30	106	92	14	18	Warec	60	100	81	19	—						
Fox	30	106	84	22	—	Stromberg dexterity test:											
Eget <sup>1</sup>	40	96	80	16	22	Echols <sup>1</sup>	10	97	90	7	10						
Echols <sup>1</sup>	40	110	81	29	—	Eget <sup>1</sup>	10	102	89	13	—						
Watrous	50	122	93	29	32	Hardin	20	93	89	4	7						
Van Ness	50	123	88	35	—	Hallau	20	99	91	8	—						
McDonald	60	109	63	46	37	Butts	20	101	93	8	—						
Warec	60	115	87	28	—	Premus	30	98	84	14	13						
Purdue pegboard test:																	
Echols	10	102	86	16	11	Fox	30	98	86	12	—						
Eget	10	101	95	6	—	Eget <sup>1</sup>	40	99	80	19	18						
Hardin	20	97	87	10	10	Echols <sup>1</sup>	40	97	80	17	—						
Hallau	20	102	95	7	—	Watrous	50	110	80	30	26						
Butts	20	103	91	12	—	Van Ness	50	100	79	21	—						
Premus	30	96	78	18	15	McDonald	60	101	79	22	22						
Fox	30	98	86	12	—	Warec	60	109	86	23	—						

<sup>1</sup> Same subjects repeated at higher dose.

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**3. Source of Data.**

See Table 8 (not printed in the RECORD) preceding Human Data section.

**4. Derivation of the Estimates.**

If it is assumed that mydriasis does not represent incapacitation, but ptosis in the monkey is a reflection of some central incapacitating effect, the lowest in incapacitating intravenous dose of EA 1476 in any animal is not less than 30  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$ . This assumption, referring to ptosis, is probably invalid, since the VDT, effective doses are between 100 and 316  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$ . Also, effective doses in the CAR test on dogs are from 50 to 100  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$ , and in the SPE test, effective doses are from 175 to 250  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$ .

Earlier studies (Fourteenth Tripartite Conference) showed that no volunteer, given an oral dose of more than 2.5 mg/man (ca. 35  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$ ), was capable of performing his regular duties. More recent studies with EA 2233, the acetate of EA 1476,<sup>9</sup> indicate that oral doses of 60  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$  (4.3 mg/70-kg man) did not cause severe incapacitation. Thus, it is indicated that a dose of 2.5 mg/man or more is required to cause incapacitation in man by oral administration. Doses of 2.5 and 4.2 mg/man are equivalent to the respective ICI<sup>10</sup>'s of 500 and 840-mg min/cu m, assuming a body weight of 70 kg, a minute volume of 10 l/min, and an aerosol respiratory retention of 50%. This also assumes that a respiratory effective dose is the same as an oral effective dose. It must be borne in mind that the inhalation route may be more or less effective than the oral route; however, the human oral doses are in general agreement with the animal data, which indicate an intravenous effective dose of 30  $\mu\text{g}/\text{kg}$  or more. Animal experimentation indicates that EA 2233 and EA 1476 are of similar effectiveness.

**5. Limitation of the Estimate.**

EA 1476, EA 2233, or the isomers have not been studied in man by the inhalation route. The human estimate is based on intravenous doses in animals and oral doses in man. It is not possible to project an aerosol human estimate from present data.

**PART IX—CONCLUSION**

The actions of EA 1476 and EA 2233 are generally similar to many other psychotropic compounds of military interest; i.e., they yield varying degrees of incapacitation, both physical and mental. Both compounds, however, are unique in eliciting an unequivocal orthostatic hypotension at dose levels far below those required to produce mild mental incapacitation.

No human studies have yet been made on isomers 2 and 4. Primate data do indicate, however, that these specific stereoisomers possess a degree of pharmacologic potency, at least equivalent to that of the racemic mixtures studied in human subjects. Secondly, no human or animal data are available on the effects of the aerosolized agents.

It is believed that data should yet be obtained from the following studies:

1. Exposure of animal and human subjects to the aerosolized racemate.
2. Exposure of human subjects to oral doses of stereoisomers 2 and 4.

**Vietnam—ADDRESS BY SENATOR MUSKIE**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at the National Press Club today, the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) gave a most thoughtful and timely address entitled "The Vietnam Debate." As always, the tenor is of the highest level, the thoughts presented are carefully reasoned, and the proposals fully constructive.

I commend this address to the entire Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**THE VIETNAM DEBATE**

(By Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE)

Since the election of President Nixon in November, 1968, and especially since the President's speech of November 3, 1969, United States policy toward Vietnam has been transformed in the public mind from the most critical issue of the times to just another policy problem.

It was understandable that the American people wanted to give a new President a chance to study the problem on his own and come up with a solution. It was understandable that we were pleased with the withdrawal of some U.S. troops and the prospect of further withdrawals. But now we must face the fact that we have stopped debating Vietnam policy, but in the year since President Nixon took office we have recorded the deaths of over 10,000 American servicemen, the wounding of 40,000 more, and the expenditure of another \$20 billion.

With ambiguous promises, with thinly veiled threats to freedom of the press, and with carefully spaced withdrawal announcements, the Nixon Administration succeeded in virtually blotting out domestic criticism of the war and erasing Vietnam from public consciousness.

Many Americans now believe or seem to want to believe that the Vietnam problem has gone away. Many Americans who know that there is much to debate have been reluctant to voice their doubts and reservations. They look at present policy as an improvement on past policy, and they hope for the best.

Without information and without alternatives, it is no wonder that a majority of American people are now silent.

I do not believe the silence will continue, and I believe the longer the debate is bottled up, the more serious will be the ultimate confrontation over Vietnam.

Therefore, I came to the National Press Club today to talk about the need for a constructive debate on Vietnam and to urge changes in our Vietnam policy.

I believe the following points need to be made:

First, those of us in public office and the news media have not been effectively focusing public attention on the policy issues in Vietnam. Because of this, the American people have not been made aware of the meaning of the President's policy and of the alternatives to that policy.

Second, I believe that what the President calls his "silent majority" is silent only because it has not been made to realize that although some U.S. troops will be coming home, we are not really getting out of Vietnam.

Third, I believe that the President's Vietnamization policy can be only a formula for the perpetuation of the war. Because it is basically a strategy for continuing the fighting, it cannot bring peace to Vietnam and it cannot get us out of Vietnam.

Fourth, I believe that an end to the war and an end to our involvement in the war can be brought about only through a negotiated settlement. There are peace proposals that the President has not tried. By his preoccupation with Vietnamizing the war, the President has turned his back on Paris. By letting almost four months go by without sending a senior personal representative to Paris, he has downgraded negotiations.

Fifth, for all these reasons, our nation must have a new national debate on Vietnam policy. There can be no debate for the people unless public figures are prepared to speak out and unless the news media are prepared to listen, report, and comment.

**THE ROLE OF THE NEWS MEDIA**

Over the last eight years, the news media have proven to be the most consistently reliable guide to facts and to understanding the war. No matter how honest the purposes of any Administration, it does have a vested interest in making the facts fit its policies. And no matter how hard it tries to ferret out divergent opinions and additional facts, a government is bound up with its own reporting system.

People in the government have learned the necessity of supplementing "official reporting." President Nixon has cited his need for "out-house" sources of information. What the President feels as a need, the public must have as an absolute requirement.

In Vietnam, newsmen dug up facts we did not hear from any other source. They probed beyond the facts to judgments about the meaning of events and programs and sought out varied points of view. We learned from all this the human price of the war and how little progress was really being made. In short, these efforts provided a basis for public evaluation.

In Washington, and around our country, we were made aware of imprecisions, ambiguities, and contradictions about U.S. policies. The news media kept alternatives to the President's policy very much before the public mind. Time and space were provided for the public to digest these alternatives. In short, these efforts gave a basis for public comparison.

But today we are getting much less than we require for informed public opinion on Vietnam.

It is not difficult to reconstruct how this happened. Vice President Agnew's attempts at intimidation set the stage. Hints about license renewal problems appeared here and there. Statements were made by "high Administration officials" from time to time that every possible solution has been tried. Implications were left that Nixon's policy will deliver more tomorrow. The President launched a campaign to convince the American people that the *only* alternative to his policy is "precipitate withdrawal."

The result has been less news coverage and less coverage in depth.

The recent hearings on Vietnam resolutions conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seems to me a typical example. In past hearings by this committee, the TV networks gave full live coverage or news specials. This time, the public saw only a few minutes at most. In fact, Vice President Agnew's wisecracks about the hearings received almost as much attention on TV and in the papers as did the hearings themselves.

And whatever happened to the immediate in-depth analysis that used to follow every Vietnam statement by President Johnson? Has the Vice President's attack against "instant analysis" produced non-analysis?

What the President keeps referring to as his "silent majority" may well be the product of too silent a press.

While public opinion polls tell us that a majority of Americans think the President is handling Vietnam policy adequately, these polls also tell us that Americans have different views of what they are supporting. Many of the silent supporters believe that the President intends to get all U.S. forces out of Vietnam—and soon. This is not the case, but this knowledge has not been adequately conveyed to the American people. The press has contributed to misapprehensions about our Vietnam policies by reducing reasoned alternatives to a few pat news phrases.

The facts and alternatives of Vietnam policy are exceedingly complex. The President can command all the air time and all the newspaper space he wants to explain his views. Those who disagree with him can be

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heard by the American public only if the news media provides the opportunity.

I am not trying to drum up press criticism for its own sake. For the sake of the public's right to know, I am asking for more probing, for more facts, for more coverage whatever the results may be.

I am not trying to make a party issue out of Vietnam. It cannot be done and it should not be done. Both Democrats and Republicans were involved in getting us into Vietnam, and both Democrats and Republicans are interested in getting out.

I want to encourage a constructive national debate on United States policy on Vietnam. President Nixon equates national debate with national disunity. He says the U.S. can be defeated only by disunity at home. I grant that the absence of national debate may make it temporarily more comfortable for Mr. Nixon, but I do not believe it can advance the cause of peace in Vietnam. In the end, absence of debate can lead only to increased divisions and ugly confrontations.

#### WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN?

The full implications of the President's plan for Vietnamizing the war remain a mystery. Backgrounders and statements by high officials in the Nixon Administration have continued to offer hope to many that the plan was to get all of our men out of Vietnam in accordance with our own interest. However, the President at his January 30 press conference made clear that this was not the case.

"We had implemented a plan in which the United States would withdraw all of its combat forces as Vietnamese forces were trained and able to take over the fighting.

"That policy of Vietnamization is irreversible.

"Now, as far as the timing of the plan is concerned, how many and at what time they come out, that, of course, will depend on the criteria that I also set forth in that speech—the criteria of the level of enemy activity, the progress in the Paris peace talks, and, of course, the other matters, the problems particularly with regard to the rate of training of the Vietnamese forces."

What does this now tell us about the plan?

First, the plan has two parts—the removal of combat forces from Vietnam and the maintaining in Vietnam of "support for the South Vietnamese logically, and until they are ready to take over . . ."

Second, the plan appears to relate primarily to ground combat forces. We still do not know what this means in numbers of men and timing. Conjecture seems to put the figure at about 300,000 which would mean at least 200,000 Americans left in Vietnam by the end of 1971 if all goes well.

Third, this is an optimistic conjecture, since the timing of both parts of the plan is not based on our own interests, but on the actions of Saigon and Hanoi. Leaving aside the Paris negotiations for the moment, this means that if Hanoi maintains or steps up the pressure and Saigon cannot hold its own, even our combat forces will remain indefinitely.

Why hasn't all this been made clear to the American people?

The silent majority would be silent no longer if this fact and this fact alone were brought to their attention. Silent Americans are assuming that Mr. Nixon is really getting us out of Vietnam. The truth of the matter is that he is pinning us down indefinitely. We have been told that Mr. Nixon's plan has been cleared with President Thieu, and President Thieu appears to be well aware of our indefinite commitment. On January 9, Thieu warned that "many years" will be required to remove U.S. combat troops.

President Nixon seems to believe that the U.S. has a vital national security interest

in keeping Thieu and Ky in power. I do not believe the American people share this objective.

#### WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM VIETNAMIZATION?

Can it work in Vietnam? Will it bring us closer to peace in Paris?

The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have been hurt by the years of war, but they show no signs of being near a breaking point. They have been fighting for 25 years to throw western military influence out of Vietnam. Can we realistically expect them to give up this goal? And on the battlefield, they can still control the level of combat, and nothing in Mr. Nixon's plan takes this away from them.

The South Vietnamese forces have improved over the years, but this improvement also serves to point up how far they have to go. They still avoid night patrolling. Their officer corps is still widely regarded as incompetent. Promotions to officer rank are still based on social status. Desertions still run as high as 10,000 per month. This figure incidentally is just an educated estimate.

And behind all this still lies a political regime which neither deserves nor receives much popular support. With all the claims we make that 90 percent of the population of the hamlets are "pacified," roughly half the hamlets are still classified as subject to significant Vietcong influence. Even at this stage of the war, the Saigon Government has no meaningful control of half of its own country. Neutralists and anyone else who speaks out against the present Saigon regime are still being jailed and hounded, while we stand silently aside. The recent incident involving Deputy Chau is only the latest example of the failure of the Thieu regime to observe democratic processes.

We should also note the continued sentiment for a peaceful settlement among the several groups in South Vietnam. In the 1967 elections which brought Thieu to power, 60 percent of those who did vote cast their ballots for some form of accommodation for peace.

The Nixon Administration looks at this and says it is "cautiously optimistic." It has its statistics about open roads, and rice production, and pacification and so on. I am not talking about the success of an American occupation, but the underlying and controlling elements of the war. These have not changed, and they do not make me "cautiously optimistic."

If we look at Laos today and magnify that situation many times, we can get a pretty good picture of what Vietnamization will look like in five or ten years—if everything goes perfectly. Without a political settlement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia the fighting will persist in Laos, and we will be always on the verge of crisis, and American participation always will be necessary and irreplaceable.

The cruel irony of Vietnamization of the war is that even if it succeeds as a military strategy it succeeds only in perpetuating the killing of Vietnamese by Vietnamese. And by so doing; it perpetuates American involvement in the war, American deaths, and the diversion of needed American resources.

The President's plan cannot bring peace because it is essentially a military strategy intended to win what is primarily a political struggle.

High Nixon Administration officials sometimes say that these long-run political problems will not have to be faced because Vietnamization will lead to successful negotiations in Paris. They say that our policy is to appear tough and demonstrate our staying power, thereby putting pressure on Hanoi to negotiate seriously in Paris. In my judgment, however, the strategy of threatening a prolonged U.S. presence is self-defeating.

As directed at Hanoi, it promises little

hope that their supporters in South Vietnam can be safe in their lives or could genuinely participate in the political life of their country. Mr. Nixon merely threatens them with more force, and a continuing American military veto.

To Saigon, we have promised much in the way of continuing military and political support, but we have conveyed little warning that American military support will not continue forever and that reasonable political concessions on their part are necessary if there is to be an end to the war. Given the prospect of our indefinite stay in Vietnam, Saigon has no incentive either to improve militarily or to bargain away its own power at the peace table. In order to maintain itself in power, the Thieu-Ky regime has every incentive to help make our stay indefinite.

In my judgment, nothing the President threatens to do in Vietnam and nothing he has done in Paris is likely to result in successful negotiations. Serious bargaining is precluded so long as both Saigon and Hanoi believe that our real aim is to stay in Vietnam indefinitely and preserve the Thieu-Ky regime.

In disregarding the Paris negotiations, the President is making his most fundamental mistake.

#### THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS—TOWARD A SETTLEMENT

The only way to end a war which is intrinsically a political struggle is through negotiations. In order to bring Paris back into the picture and improve the chances for a peaceful settlement, the President must take two steps he has not taken.

First, he must replace Ambassador Lodge with another senior personal representative and close the symbolic but important protocol gap.

This seems like a small step, but the North Vietnamese are not unique in their concern for diplomatic niceties, and they are not indifferent to matters of general international courtesy. Le Duc Tho, Xuan Thuy and Madame Binh from North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government respectively outrank Ambassador Phillip Habib and any member of the South Vietnamese delegation by several levels. As a negotiator, Mr. Habib's obvious ability cannot compensate for his obvious unacceptability.

The protocol gap has crucial practical consequences. Our delegation to negotiations must have recognized authority to probe the other side's position, to command the attention of the President, and to propose needed and sensible compromises. We should also insist that Saigon upgrade its team in Paris.

A new senior man in Paris is the necessary first step in recreating a serious atmosphere for diplomacy.

Second, the President must develop a proposal that is negotiable, a proposal which will create the necessary climate for a settlement of those differences. Specifically, I have in mind our trying to negotiate a U.S. withdrawal timetable, and coupling this with an informal arrangement regarding the withdrawal of North Vietnam forces and a reduction in the level of violence.

There is some reason to believe that Hanoi would be receptive to such an approach. But the Administration has been reluctant to probe possible changes in Hanoi's position. Such probing, we are told, would be regarded by Hanoi as a sign of American weakness. This is simply another illustration of how Vietnamization has become a roadblock not a path to peace.

This brings us to the issue of an announced withdrawal timetable.

President Nixon says that he has a withdrawal plan, and that Saigon knows and agrees with it. However, he refuses to make it known to the American public. If Saigon knows, then Hanoi is also informed. Only the American people remain unfamiliar with the details.

He says if he announces a timetable, Hanoi will wait until we are vulnerable and then attack us. But Hanoi can wait and do this at a time and place of its own choosing, whether or not Mr. Nixon announces a timetable.

He says that an announced timetable would take away Hanoi's incentive to compromise. We have been in Paris for over a year and a half, and it is obvious that Hanoi finds no incentives for compromise in our present policy.

All this leads me to conclude that we are still following the endless path to an unreachable military victory, and that the Paris peace negotiations have become the forgotten chapter of the war in Vietnam.

In conclusion, I think we come to three points.

First, because American and Vietnamese lives continue to be lost and because billions of American dollars continue to be spent, a new national debate is in order.

Second, because I believe the President's Vietnamization policy can lead only to the prolongation of the war and because I believe a real end to the war can come only through negotiations, a new national debate is a necessity.

And, finally, because the issues demand the understanding attention of the American public, the role of the press in faithfully reporting this national debate is indispensable.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER** (Mr. ALLEN in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—APPROVAL OF JOINT RESOLUTION

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one of his secretaries, and he announced that on March 4, 1970, the President had approved and signed the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 180) to provide for a temporary prohibition of strikes or lockouts with respect to the current railway labor-management dispute.

#### VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENT OF 1969

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** At this time the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business which the clerk will report.

**THE ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK.** A bill (H.R. 4249) to extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 with respect to the discriminatory use of tests and devices.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

#### SCOTT-HART AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ADOPTED

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the right to vote is the most central and precious right in our system of government. Every President and every Congress in our Nation's history has attested to the fact that the free and secret ballot is the foundation of America. The ballot box has always been our means of settling disputes. The vote has been the primary weapon in the arsenal of the American citizen. We have used the ballot both to support national policies and to demand change and reform.

Sadly, almost 200 years after the birth of our Republic and a full 100 years after the ratification of the 15th amendment to the Constitution, a significant proportion of our adult population is denied the opportunity to vote. Black Americans have been systematically kept off the voting rolls in some sections of the country—sometimes through undisguised legislation, but more often through devious devices. There can be no excuse for this in a democracy.

In a message to Congress in 1963, President Kennedy said:

The right to vote in a free American election is the most powerful and precious right in the world—and it must not be denied on the grounds of race or color. It is a potent key to achieving other rights of citizenship.

President Johnson told Congress in March, 1965:

Many of the issues of civil rights are complex and difficult. But about this there can be no argument. Every American citizen must have an equal right to vote. There is no duty which weighs more heavily on us than the duty to insure that right.

The passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act by Congress was a tribute to the persistent efforts of President Johnson and to the high ideals and endless zeal of our beloved President Kennedy. The Voting Rights Act was the first frontal assault on a longstanding and pervasive evil, which had been perpetrated in some parts of the country for more than 100 years by constant and ingenious defiance of the Constitution. Three earlier enactments in 1957, 1960, and 1964 had failed to ease blatant discrimination in the electoral processes in certain areas, primarily in the South. These laws gave the U.S. Attorney General the power to institute lawsuits to protect the right to vote.

This case-by-case approach was met by massive State and local resistance. The result was only the most meager gains in Negro voter registration. In Mississippi, for example, registration increased from 4.4 percent in 1954 to but 6.7 percent by 1964; in contrast, 70 percent of the State's white population was registered.

The 1965 Voting Rights Act, the enactment into law of which Presidents Kennedy and Johnson exerted wise leadership, is different from the voting legislation that preceded it and was an improvement. This law has been the most effective civil rights legislation ever enacted by the Congress. The 1965 act provides for immediate and automatic application instead of lengthy and repeated litigation.

Automatic application works. Black men and women who had earlier been systematically denied the right to vote in many Southern States registered and voted in record numbers following 1965.

In Mississippi, the nonwhite population registration to vote increased from 6.7 percent in 1964 to 59.9 percent in 1968; in Alabama, from 19 to 57 percent; in Georgia, from 27 to 56 percent; in Louisiana, from 32 to 59 percent; and in South Carolina, from 37 to 51 percent.

In addition, many black citizens are now candidates for State and local offices in Southern States. This helps as-

sure adequate representation of all citizens. Charles Evers of Fayette, Miss., has distinguished himself as one of the South's most concerned and progressive mayors. Julian Bond of Georgia is one of the Nation's best known and most promising of the younger generation of the South manifesting interest in public affairs and in public office.

Progress has been phenomenal. However, there is much more to be accomplished. Negro registration is still well below that of white men and women in every Southern State. In many counties Negro registration is less than half that of white men and women. Resistance to equal voting rights is still rampant in some Southern States.

This is not the time to discard the only voting rights law that has really worked. That law should be extended and expanded, not weakened.

Never has there been a more important time to assure voting rights for all Americans. The past few years has seen an alarming increase in crime, mounting disruptions on college campuses, and extensive violence in the major cities of the country, in the North and also in the South. To deny to one group of people the precious right to vote is to deny that group a stake in the democratic process. To deny the ballot as a means of settling disputes is to invite settlement of those disputes in the streets. If the weapon of the vote is not available, some other weapons will be.

Mr. President, I know that President Kennedy, who fought so hard for human rights and human dignity, and President Johnson, who most regrettably is ill today in a San Antonio hospital, would urge us to extend and strengthen the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

President Nixon on December 10, 1969, wrote a letter to the distinguished minority leader of the House of Representatives. In that letter, which has been printed in the RECORD, the President stated, "Justice is diminished for any citizen who does not have the right to vote for those who govern him. There is no way for the disenfranchised to consider themselves equal partners in our society." If the President believes those words, and I assume he does, he will support an extension of the 1965 act. If he is truly concerned about the millions who remain disenfranchised he should, it seems to be, announce his support for the substitute offered by the distinguished senior Senators from Pennsylvania and Michigan and eight other Senators who are members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

The Scott-Hart amendment provides for full extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In addition, it makes uniform throughout the Nation the ban on discriminatory literacy tests and eliminates restrictive residency requirements. This is an important and carefully considered piece of legislation. I enthusiastically support the Scott-Hart amendment and urge its adoption.

Mr. EASTLAND obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. EASTLAND. I yield.

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terials, entrained or contained, are buried at this site, the particulates in the form of unfixed or loose contamination would be the only potential source. The operational procedures require that all material received for disposal is placed in trenches, compacted, and covered with three feet of soil. These procedures provide adequate assurance that aerial dispersion of any particulates will not occur.

From a public health and safety standpoint, the waste burial site must provide a protective barrier so that radioactivity will be confined to the waste burial pits. The control mechanism which limits any movement of radioactivity from the site is dependent upon such factors as solubility, permeability of the soil, ion exchange capacity, availability of water, and distance to the source of potable water. The geology, hydrology, and the permeability of the soils in the vicinity of NRTS have been reported by the U.S. Geological Survey<sup>8</sup>. Substantial thicknesses of continuous layers of alluvial soils beneath the burial ground would be expected to provide a barrier to migrating radionuclides through ion-exchange. However, there is a lack of data on geology and lithology beneath the burial site. The closest drill holes which have been logged are several miles away<sup>9</sup>. It must, therefore, be considered conceivable that continuous cracked and/or channeled basalt formations could extend from the bottom of the burial pits and trenches to the aquifer. Until more information on subsurface geology at the burial ground becomes available, the separation distance to the aquifer cannot be considered as a protective barrier. It is therefore rec-

ommended that a minimum of two feet of alluvial soil be required beneath all buried wastes. Unless several feet of soil separate buried wastes and basaltic rock formations, no credit can be allowed for removal of radioactivity by the ion-exchange mechanism.

In discussions with NRTS personnel, it was stated that snow melts have occurred in recent years which caused the flooding of trenches for periods as long as 30 days. Therefore, despite the low average precipitation, water is available during certain periods of time as a leaching and transport agent to the aquifer. Even if measures to provide alluvial soil cover under buried wastes are employed, the presence and residency of leaching water in the trench is highly undesirable. Flood control measures for the burial should, therefore, be taken to prevent any accumulation of water in the trenches and pits. These control measures include covering and mounding each trench and pit with a minimum of three feet of soil above the ground level, digging a drainage ditch around each pit and trench, and removing snow. During the visit to the burial site, it was noted that flood control measures have been initiated to provide for drainage of water from the area.

On the basis of the evaluation of the waste disposal burial operations and the examination of environmental surveillance data, there is no evidence which indicates that any radioactive material has migrated from the burial ground. However, as an added safety measure, the on-site monitoring should be intensified to provide confirmation that no migration is occurring. Because of the long half-life radioactive material, such as plutonium and americium, buried at the site

and its location above a highly productive aquifer, a great degree of conservatism has been exercised in examining the precautions which have been employed in the solid waste disposal operations. Because of the long-term considerations that apply to the burial of plutonium and americium, additional protective measures should be adopted by the AEC in management of the waste burial ground. Thus, it is recommended that (1) the operational procedures for burial of long half-life radioactive materials be modified so that the plutonium and americium waste is segregated in the burial pits, (2) monitoring be intensified to provide a positive indication that radioactive material has not migrated from the waste burial pits, and (3) plutonium and americium waste be accessible for removal from the burial pit, should it be detected in the monitoring holes.

Additional information of the geological formations beneath the burial site is needed to fully evaluate the possibility of waste solutions seeping down to the water table and to determine the rate of the lateral movement from the site. Therefore, it is recommended that test holes be drilled in the vicinity of the burial site to provide detailed information in the lithology and character of the alluvial deposits and underlying basalt.

In summary, the present operational procedures and land burial methods meet the radiation safety criteria and will not result in a health and safety problem in the off-site area. The additional safety measures recommended in this study will provide further assurance that long half-life radioactive materials are confined to the waste disposal grounds.

TABLE 1—ON- AND OFFSITE SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Identification	January through June			July through December			Identification	January through June			July through December		
	Containers	Volume (cubic feet)	Activity (curies)	Containers	Volume (cubic feet)	Activity (curies)		Containers	Volume (cubic feet)	Activity (curies)	Containers	Volume (cubic feet)	Activity (curies)
1968													
Category I:													
(A) Onsite:													
High level	21	88	626,266	42	718	872,600							
Intermediate	208	3,392	316,074	169	4,020	147,231							
Low level	4,543	64,375	22,476	4,202	68,689	3,025							
(B) Offsite:													
High level													
Intermediate													
Low level													
(A) and (B) total	13,821	159,400	122	4,641	11,185	186,057	4,641	15,594	227,265	969,579	15,598	259,484	1,027,497

## SUMMARY

Year	On-site		Off-site		On- and Off-site		Year	On-site		Off-site		On- and Off-site	
	Volume (cubic meters)	Activity (curies)	Volume (cubic meters)	Activity (curies)	Volume (cubic meters)	Activity (curies)		Volume (cubic meters)	Activity (curies)	Volume (cubic meters)	Activity (curies)	Volume (cubic meters)	Activity (curies)
1955					1,910	1,500	1962	4,462	112,369	3,703	5,808	8,171	118,177
1956	2,754		1,066		3,820	10,000	1963	3,178	239,518	5,477	14,047	8,755	253,565
1957	3,269		1,701		4,970	15,000	1964	3,133	143,194	3,752	2,291	6,885	145,485
1958	5,909		971		6,909	10,500	1965	4,095	146,686	3,434	10,032	7,529	1,456,718
1959	2,813		1,667		4,480	23,600	1966	4,568	3,303,410	4,858	17,276	9,516	3,320,686
1960	3,462		1,948		5,410	9,200	1967	3,843	4,059,299	5,843	11,458	9,686	4,070,757
1961	3,022	134,038	4,662	21,737	7,684	155,775	1968	3,998	1,987,674	9,777	9,404	13,774	1,997,078

TABLE 2—SOLID WASTE NUCLIDE RADIACITY

Origin of waste	Identified activity in curies						Origin of waste	Identified activity in curies					
	U-235	U-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Am-241	Co-60		U-235	U-238	Pu-239	Pu-240	Am-241	Co-60
NRTS (1960 through 1967)...	1.40	<0.01	130	<0.01	170,000		Offsite (1968)...		14.1	3,579	—	5,689	—
NRTS (1968)...	14.4	<0.01	59	80.00	—	129,000	Total...	21.03	78.9	23,056	80.00	25,809	298,952
Offsite (1954 through 1967)...	5.23	64.5	19,288	—	20,120	—	Nuclide half-life (years)...	7×10 <sup>3</sup>	4×10 <sup>4</sup>	2×10 <sup>4</sup>	7×10 <sup>3</sup>	470	5

## FOOTNOTES

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cal Survey, prepared on behalf of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

<sup>2</sup> "Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal", Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, 1959, Vol. 1, pp. 135-139, 579-614.

<sup>3</sup> "National Reactor Testing Station", U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Idaho Falls, Idaho, "Thumbnail Sketch", July 1967.

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<sup>4</sup> "Environmental Monitoring Report No. 24", U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, National Reactor Testing Station, Scoville, Idaho, June 1969.

<sup>5</sup> Osloond, Joe H. and Newcomb, D. L.: "Radioactive Waste Disposal Data for the National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho", Idaho Operations Office, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, April 1969.

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<sup>6</sup> Voegeli, P. T. and Deutsch, Morris: "Geology, Water Supply and Waste Disposal at Sites II and IIA Burial Ground D and Vicinity, NRTS, Idaho", U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, IDO-22027, Boise, Idaho, June 1953.

<sup>7</sup> Barracough, J. T., Teasdale, W. E., and Jensen, R. G.: "Hydrology of the National Reactor Testing Station", Annual Progress Report—1965, U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, prepared in cooperation with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

<sup>8</sup> Barracough, J. T.: "Geology and Hydrology of the National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho", U.S. Geological Survey, Idaho Falls, Idaho, prepared for presentation to the Advisory Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, Natural Academy of Science, April 18, 1969.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 1,885-1,886.

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U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., February 13, 1970.

Mr. GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On September 12, 1969, as you know, I called upon four Federal agencies to study the waste disposal practices of the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho.

That portion of the report regarding solid waste disposal practices, written by the Public Health Service, has now been completed.

It is my understanding that the AEC is in receipt of the recommendations of the study group. Their recommendations were:

(1) Each trench and pit should be covered and maintained with a minimum of three feet of soil above the ground level.

(2) A minimum of two feet of alluvial soil should be required beneath all buried wastes.

(3) Flood control measures should be taken to prevent any accumulation of water in the trenches and pits.

(4) Test holes should be drilled in the vicinity of the burial site to provide detailed information on the lithology and character of the alluvial deposits of underlying basalt.

(5) Plutonium and americium waste should be segregated in special pits.

(6) Monitoring should be intensified to provide a positive indication that radioactive material has not migrated from the waste burial ground.

(7) Plutonium and americium waste should be accessible for removal from the burial ground should it be detected in monitoring holes.

To those recommendations, I would add two of my own:

(1) That no liquid waste be stored at the present burial site and that if liquid wastes are presently on the site, they be removed to an area not located over the Aquifer.

It is apparent from the whole background of my studies into this problem that the possibility of high yield liquid waste seepage into the Aquifer makes this site particularly unsuited for liquid disposal. The great care taken to avoid the possibility of water seepage through the site and into the Aquifer, and the recommendations by the Public Health Service designed to reduce the possibility of on-site water to the lowest possible level, indicates to me a genuine, high hazard situation if liquid wastes are now stored, or are contemplated for storage at the present burial site.

(2) That if the AEC is not already conducting such tests, soil tests as well as air and water data be gathered at the NRTS and surrounding lands.

This request is made in view of the recent situation at the Rocky Flats, Colorado site. I feel it is in the best interests of both the AEC and the public to know of any contamination of the soil in the area. I note from the *Environmental Monitoring Report No. 23*, published by the AEC and released on October 20, 1969, covering the period of July to December 1968, that regular monitoring of radioactivity in air, water and foodstuffs are the only functions presently performed.

I respectfully call upon the Commission to implement at the earliest possible date the recommendations contained in this letter.

Sincerely,

FRANK CHURCH.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I have described today a case of nuclear waste problems concerning the nuclear reactor testing station in Idaho. Other cases have appeared in the press throughout the country. Safe and sure practices for the disposal of nuclear wastes must be perfected if peaceful uses for the atom are to flourish in future years. The time to start is now.

Two weeks ago I called for a greatly expanded research program on the whole question of safe disposal practices. I will follow up with further recommendations at a later time. For the moment, however, I think it important that the full record concerning the situation at the NRTS in Idaho, including the report which has just been given by these four Federal agencies, together with their specific recommendations for reforms in the current practices at the NRTS "burial ground," be made a part of the public record. It is for this purpose that I have placed these materials in the RECORD today.

## THE PORT OF HAIPHONG AND THE NORTH VIETNAM ECONOMY

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, one of the ablest news writers, in my judgment, is Daniel DeLuce, of the Associated Press. Mr. DeLuce is the first American newspaperman in recent years to visit the important North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. He was a combat correspondent in World War II and won the Pulitzer Prize for reporting.

I know Mr. DeLuce well. He is an unusually able news man and is a person of the highest integrity. His dispatch from Haiphong, North Vietnam, was distributed by the Associated Press sev-

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eral days ago, I shall read several paragraphs into the RECORD.

HAIPHONG, North Vietnam.—North Vietnam's industrial recovery from more than four years of American bombing begins on the bustling docks of Haiphong.

Freights from many countries unload new tractors, cranes, bulldozers and steamrollers for repair of cratered roads and smashed bridges. Trucks of many shapes and sizes arrive to redevelop commercial transportation. Power generators come in for dispersed factories, and a variety of machine tools.

Haiphong has been through

\* \* \* \* \*

The Soviet Union, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland continue to contribute essential imports which funnel through Haiphong. China's important trade is carried on not only on ship but by road and rail across a long land frontier.

Now, Mr. President, at the same time that I was reading the dispatch about Haiphong this morning, I was reading the casualty lists for Americans this past week, which amounted to 100 killed and nearly 500 wounded.

That brings to mind the free world shipping which goes into Haiphong to supply North Vietnam.

Mr. DeLuce, in his dispatch from North Vietnam, brought out the fact that the Soviet Union, East Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland continue to ship through that port.

I hold in my hand the figures for calendar year 1969, by months, of the amount of free world shipping which has been going into Haiphong.

I emphasize that I am speaking now about free world shipping, those nations who are, presumably, friends of the United States.

During calendar year 1969, 74 ships flying the flag of Great Britain carried cargo into Haiphong for North Vietnam.

The total dead weight displacement of those ships was more than 500,000 tons.

Eight ships flying the flag of Somali carried cargo into Haiphong for North Vietnam during 1969; nine ships flying the flag of Cyprus, four carrying the flag of Singapore, one ship carrying the flag of Malta, and three ships carrying the flag of Japan, all carried cargo into Haiphong for North Vietnam.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON in the chair). The time of the Senator from Virginia has expired.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia, I thank the Chair.

As we all know, the freedom of Japan is being guaranteed by the United States. Japan has asked the United States to turn over the island of Okinawa to the administrative control of Japan.

I think it is of some significance that although Japan also wants the United States to return to her administrative control over the Ryukyus, which were given to the United States by treaty, still, three ships flying the flag of Japan carried cargo into the enemy port of Haiphong for North Vietnam.

In all, a total of 99 free world ships, flying the flags of free world nations, carried cargo into Haiphong into North Vietnam during calendar year 1969.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have a table on this subject printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,

## EXHIBIT 1.—FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM 1969

	British		Somali		Cyprus		Singapore		Japanese		Maltese		TOTAL	
	Number	GRT DWT	Number	GRT DWT	Number	GRT DWT	Number	GRT DWT	Number	GRT DWT	Number	GRT DWT	Number	GRT DWT
January	8	34,597	2	8,973	1	2,137	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	45,707
		47,200		12,600		3,100		—		—		—	10	62,900
February	6	30,824		—	1	2,137	2	8,148	1	3,896		—	45,005	64,400
		44,300		—		3,100		11,000		6,000		—	7	36,867
March	6	27,870	1	8,997		—		—		—		—	9	53,109
		39,600		13,500		—		—		695		—	7	33,787
April	7	29,714	1	3,378		—		—		717		—	12	55,717
		50,000		5,000		—		—		—		5,333	57,806	
May	9	45,802	1	4,534	1	2,137		—		—		9,400	11	81,900
		63,400		6,000		3,100		—		—		—	6	49,639
June	6	30,195	2	7,912	2	7,308	1	4,224		—		—	7	76,800
		47,100		11,000		12,200		6,500		—		—	7	35,038
July	8	31,660	1	3,378		—		—		—		—	6	47,400
		42,400		5,000		—		—		—		—	6	34,815
August	4	25,589		—	2	9,226		—		—		—	6	54,300
		41,100		—		13,200		—		—		—	6	23,731
September	4	16,714		—	1	2,137	1	4,880		—		—	6	35,400
		23,400		—		3,100		8,900		—		—	6	27,715
October	4	20,024		—	1	6,996		—	1	695		—	7	39,117
		27,500		—		10,900		—		717		—	7	33,889
November	7	33,889		—		—		—		—		—	7	41,100
		41,100		—		—		—		—		—	7	30,797
December	7	30,797		—		—		—		—		—	7	40,400
Total	74	357,675	8	37,172	9	32,078	4	17,252	3	5,286	1	5,333	99	454,796
		507,500		53,100		48,700		26,400		7,434		9,400		652,534

I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks, a table entitled "Free World Shipping to Cuba."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, we find, in this regard, that during calendar year 1969, 204 ships flying the flags of free world nations, carried cargo to Cuba. Of the 204, 50 flew the flag of Great Britain, and 117 the flag of Cyprus.

Mr. President, I regret that our free world friends are not cooperating better with the United States.

The United States has suffered 350,000 casualties in Vietnam during the past few years, of which 50,000, in round numbers, have been killed; yet, we find that one of America's oldest allies, Great Britain, is continuing to permit ships to fly her flag in order to carry cargo into Haiphong for North Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from a statement by Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Army, retired, on this subject.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Today in South Viet Nam we could quickly bring the Communists to their knees if all the members of SEATO were to join realistically in establishing a tight economic blockade around North Viet Nam. Further, they should boycott those who attempt to supply the enemy with munitions of war. Why should the U.S. commit over half-a-million men in Southeast Asia when we know there are over a billion people in that general area? If those people really value their freedom, let them fight for it. Only Korea and the South Vietnamese are doing their share along with the U.S.

March 6, 1970

## EXHIBIT 2—FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO CUBA 1969

Flag	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	Total
British	3	4	7	8	2	7	2	4	3	2	3	5	50
Cyprus	7	7	4	8	14	7	8	14	16	11	9	11	117
French	1		1										2
Italian		1		2		1		1		1	2	1	15
Somali	1	1		3	2	1	1	1			1		1
Yugoslav			1	1	1	1			1		1		6
Maltese					1								1
Lebanese			1	1	1				1				4
Finnish			2										2
Total	13	13	16	23	21	17	13	21	20	14	15	18	204

## APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair, on behalf of the Vice President, pursuant to Public Law 82-414, appoints the following Senators to the Joint Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy: ERVIN, FONG, and THURMOND.

## LAOS

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, the discussion on Laos and the war in Southeast Asia is intensifying.

The major statement made yesterday on this subject in an address before the National Press Club, was made by the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), a leading contender for the Democratic nomination for President. All of us know of his honest and genuine concern over the war in Southeast Asia.

Of course, all Senators share his concern. The speech was widely reported in the news media. It was published on the front page of the New York Times, and the Washington Post gave it considerable space.

The New York Times article said that the Senator from Maine was suggesting a new approach to the peace talks in Paris.

I would therefore suggest that the Senator from Maine has a responsibility to furnish the administration and the public with his concrete ideas about a new approach to the Paris peace talks. What are they? If they have any merit I am sure that President Nixon will be more than happy to examine them closely, and perhaps even give them a try.

From the reports I read, both in the Times and the Post, he said nothing new whatsoever, about the recent reports from Laos, or about Vietnam, except general criticism about the war in Southeast Asia.

What is new about that?

The brandnew approach has been President Nixon's policy in Vietnam, of turning the war over to the Vietnamese, the substantial troop withdrawals which have been made to date, and the recent announcements of further troop withdrawals for the near future.

The Senator from Maine was reported in the New York Times as accusing the administration of ambiguous promises and no alternatives.

I do not see what could be more ambiguous than the suggestions made by the Senator from Maine as reported in the New York Times which said that:

Mr. Muskie urged basic policy changes ranging from a "new approach to the peace talks in Paris" to "a fresh look at the Saigon regime."

Frankly, Mr. President, using the same words of the Senator from Maine, I do not see that anything could be more ambiguous on new alternatives in Southeast Asia than that statement.

Again, I inquire of the Senator from Maine, Mr. MUSKIE, that if he has indeed any new approaches to the peace talks in Paris, that he should advise the Nation at once.

In this morning's Washington Post there is an article written by Joseph Alsop entitled "Prevailing Double Standard on Laos Should Be Abandoned."

I recommend this to the reading of all Senators, and by all those who have been talking about Laos recently.

The major thrust of the article is to say that while, much has been said recently about the business going on in Laos right now, nothing has been said about the past events in Laos, especially the previous peace treaty regarding Laos, and especially the Ho Chi Minh trail, was violated by the opposition before the ink was hardly dry.

That is a meaningful part of this debate, too. Those so critical of Laos should bring into the picture some of the background on what has gone on through the years.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## PREVAILING DOUBLE STANDARD ON LAOS SHOULD BE ABANDONED

(By Joseph Alsop)

Where is Gov. Averell Harriman, one wonders? And why has he not been speaking up about the currently dangerous problem in Laos?

With great patience and astuteness, and under instruction from President Kennedy, Gov. Harriman negotiated the Geneva Accord on Laos in 1962. At Gov. Harriman's urging, the leading neutralist and Laotian patriot Prince Souvanna Phouma, was therefore installed in the prime ministership, which he still holds.

The key features of the Harriman-negotiated accord further seemed to guarantee a free run to Prince Souvanna in his own country. Both the United States and North Vietnam undertook to withdraw all their troops from Laos.

Hanoi further promised, most solemnly, to cease using Laos as a transit route for men bound for the war in South Vietnam. To make the outlook still more hopeful, the

Soviet Union guaranteed that the North Vietnamese would keep these promises.

As soon as the accord was signed, the United States immediately withdrew every last one of the considerable number of United States soldiers and officers who had been serving in Laos in advisory and supporting roles. Hanoi, meanwhile, had a far larger number of troops in Laos—no less than 6,000 at that time, and therefore quite enough to cause a decisive tilt in the military balance in such a tiny country. But of these 6,000 North Vietnamese troops, exactly 40 were withdrawn!

Hanoi's flagrant disregard for the accord that Gov. Harriman negotiated did not end there, either. The promise to cease using the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam was also broken before the ink on the treaty was dry. In this century's ugly history of such episodes, there has been no cruder, more open, more shameless instance of treaty violation.

Before long, the Soviet guarantees, given to Gov. Harriman and embodied in the treaty in apparent good faith, had also proved to be utterly worthless. In these circumstances, the neutralist, Prince Souvanna Phouma, had nowhere to turn except to the United States.

Prince Souvanna therefore asked for U.S. aid, though not for a return of any Americans in uniform. Granting Prince Souvanna's request was urgently advised by Gov. Harriman's personal choice for the U.S. Embassy in Laos, the able William Sullivan, now in charge of the Vietnamese problem in the State Department.

Ambassador Sullivan's request was warmly approved by President Kennedy; and U.S. aid therefore began to be provided in the form of supplies, additional money and civilian volunteers capable of helping Laos in various ways. And as the North Vietnamese violations of Gov. Harriman's treaty continuously grew more massive, more outrageous and more dangerous to Laos, U.S. aid had to be increased.

This is the long and short of the U.S. role in Laos, which is now being "exposed" by certain senators and could have no better illustration of the curious double standard invariably employed by people like Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

One wonders why he and his friends are not rather more busy exposing the North Vietnamese violations of the Harriman-negotiated treaty. These violations, after all, are the sole cause of the U.S. role in Laos. But of these violations, nothing has been said by the expose-experts.

Aside from these ironies, moreover, this is now an acutely dangerous situation. In the recurrent offensives in each year's dry season in Laos, Hanoi has never before employed more than elements of two North Vietnamese regiments.

This year, in sharp contrast, major elements of two North Vietnamese divisions, the 312th and the 816th, are being used in Laos, without counting the tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops along the

# Senate

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1970

The Senate met at 9:30 o'clock a.m. and was called to order by Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou, who hast been our dwelling place in all generations, help us to treat this world as our Father's house wherein Thy family dwells. Deliver us from fear of making this earth our home. Give us wisdom this day and every day to create a dwelling where all may come and go with equity and justice. Help us so to order our lives that this Nation and the whole world may be an abode fit for Thy children to dwell in safety and in peace. Let goodness and mercy abide with us here that we may abide with Thee forever.

In Thy holy name we pray. Amen.

## DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read a communication to the Senate.

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,  
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D.C., March 11, 1970.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL,  
President pro tempore.

Mr. ALLEN thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

## THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, March 10, 1970, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO TOMORROW AT 10 A.M.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR SCHWEIKER TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow, immediately after the prayer, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCHWEIKER) be recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, the Senator from Ohio (Mr. YOUNG) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

## U.S. SECRET WAR IN LAOS MUST END

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, President Nixon ended a long administration silence about Laos last Friday by announcing that the United States has 1040 ground forces in Laos, has lost 400 planes there, and has suffered approximately 300 casualties. That statement is, at best, a very conservative estimate of our involvement in Laos. At worst, it represents a massive effort by officials of the Defense Establishment of the United States to deceive the American people. That deception must not be allowed to continue. It is most unfortunate that President Nixon is escalating and expanding our involvement in a civil war in Vietnam by intensifying our fighting on the ground in Laos and bombing areas in Laos, sometimes 200 miles, and more, from the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Pathet Lao, seeking national liberation in Laos, have been fighting for 20 years, first against the French seeking to maintain their lush Indo-Chinese empire and now against the American CIA and air and ground forces waging a war of aggression seeking to continue the policies of the French in violation of the Geneva agreement, which we approved, to neutralize Laos as a neutral barrier nation.

President-Nixon has announced that he is withdrawing combat troops from Vietnam on the basis of a secret timetable. Whatever may be the President's plan—and that plan is still his secret—our withdrawal has clearly been too slow. Now it is obvious that even our gradual disengagement is not a reality. What is really happening is a reengagement in Laos with new titles and different uniforms.

At present we are waging an air war on a tremendous scale in Laos. U.S. planes, including B-52's, are currently hurling more than 16,000 tons of bombs a month onto Laos. Without doubt, our bombing of North Vietnam, which considerably exceeded the bombing in World War II in both the Pacific and European areas, has not ceased as we had been told. That bombing has simply been

shifted—as have some of our ground forces—across the border into Laos. Much of our recent bombing has been in the Plain of Jars, in areas more than 200 miles away from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Therefore, that bombing could have nothing to do with infiltration from North Vietnam.

In October 1965 I spent approximately 10 days in Laos, and again in 1968 I was in every area of Laos, traveling to many places by helicopter in that landlocked country. By the way, Laos was the most underdeveloped country I have been in, and I have been in a great many. Laos is not worth the life of even one American youngster. I had learned from previous visits in Laos and Vietnam that they have a way of directing so-called VIP's over certain areas. I learned in a short time to get away from escort officers, say I was looking for Ohio GI's, and get on my own. With my eyes open, and with a lot of energy throughout the day, and sometimes at night, I tried my best to get away from the restrictions and from the travel programs stipulated by the top brass in Saigon. Less than 2 weeks ago, three American newspapermen did the same thing as I did, on a much larger scale. They walked 8 miles through the jungle without informing anyone of their intention and reached an airfield staffed by a small army of American soldiers dressed as civilians. They observed U.S. B-52 planes taking off from this airfield at the rate of one per minute loaded with tons of bombs.

Mr. President, the United States has lost more than 400 airplanes and many helicopters shot down over Laos or destroyed on the ground by Pathet Lao fire. Many airmen have been killed or are missing—some, no doubt, being held as prisoners of war.

The intervention of this country into the civil war in Laos, a civil war which has continued for more than 20 years, has been achieved without any congressional authority whatever. The discredited Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 gives no authority to pursue military adventures not directly related to the war in Vietnam; our bombing of northern and central Laos clearly has no relation to the Vietnam conflict.

In fact, U.S. military activity in Laos is in direct violation of the National Commitments Resolution which requires specific congressional approval for every new engagement of American troops abroad. It is also contrary to the recent amendment to the defense appropriation bill prohibiting use of funds for U.S. ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand.

President Nixon attempted to make our conduct of the war in Laos as much a secret as his plan for ending the war in Vietnam, which he told about while a candidate for President. He tried to

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keep it a secret until adverse public opinion and editorial dissent caused him to disclose some of the facts relating to the operations of our CIA in Laos and of our air and ground forces. Primarily through the work of some enterprising correspondents and the persistence of several U.S. Senators, part of the cloak of secrecy has been penetrated. The facts that have been uncovered are shocking.

Military supplies and personnel are ferried throughout Laos by Air America and Continental Air Services, private companies under contract with the U.S. Government. Most of the pilots for these charters—which have come to be known as the "CIA airlines"—are former Air Force officers. Reporters are barred from observing military missions and information regarding our bombing in Laos.

In addition, Thailand-based American jets and bombers, under the euphemism of "armed reconnaissance flights," have mounted aerial bombardments equal to the pounding of North Vietnam just prior to the bombing halt of 1968.

American assistance to Laos is now reliably estimated at almost \$300 million per year. Yet only the technical aid budget, about \$60 million, is made public. The rest, disguised in the budgets of the Agency for International Development and other agencies, is earmarked almost exclusively for military purposes.

Mr. President, after many of the horrifying aspects of our involvement in Laos had been uncovered by unofficial sources, President Nixon on March 6 undertook an explanation of American policy there. That explanation leaves us more confused than before. The President declared in his report that not one American soldier has been killed in Laos. The next day, however, the Washington Post published an eyewitness report from an American writer disclosing that an American Army adviser, Capt. Joseph Bush, was killed in ground combat on the western edge of the Plain of Jars on February 11, 1969. This was almost 13 months ago. Then just recently White House officials announced that 27 American soldiers have been killed in Laos.

These revelations belie the President's statement early this March that no soldier has been killed in Laos. I hope that this is not a harbinger either of this administration's communication with the public on events in Southeast Asia or its ability to oversee affairs in that quagmire of despair.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "GI Death Reported," written by Don A. Schanche and published in the Washington Post of March 8, 1970, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. President Nixon's "explanation" turns out to be nothing more than an attempt to shift the blame to two previous administrations and to the North Vietnamese. This kind of effort to shirk responsibility can only lead us further down the path toward full-scale massive involvement in another Asian civil war.

President Truman kept a sign on his desk in the White House which read, "The Buck Stops Here." That philosophy, to which President Truman was always faithful, should be adopted by the present President. President Nixon must recognize his responsibility to give the facts to the American people and to comply with congressional directives that prohibit U.S. involvement in Laos.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

## EXHIBIT 1

## GI DEATH REPORTED

(By Don A. Schanche)

(NOTE.—Don A. Schanche, a free-lance writer and former managing editor of the Saturday Evening Post, was living among the embattled Meo tribesmen last winter, preparing his book, "Mr. Pop: The Adventures of a Peaceful Man in a Small War," to be published in April. Shortly after the fatal military action recounted here, he was ordered by the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane to leave the battle area. Embassy officials refused to discuss the affair or to acknowledge the death of Captain Bush.)

Capt. Joseph Bush, an American army adviser to the Royal Army of Laos, was killed by North Vietnamese soldiers in ground combat at Muong Soui, on the western edge of the Plain of Jars, on Feb. 11, 1969. Before he was almost literally cut in half by enemy automatic weapons fire, Bush, a light-haired, crewcut infantry officer, killed one Communist soldier.

I was spending the night in a Lao refugee village about 30 miles south of Muong Soui on the night Bush died.

Had I not been on hand early the next morning when his assistant, a Negro sergeant called "Smokes" was evacuated for treatment of a bullet wound in the right shoulder, I would never have learned of the incident. The U.S. embassy in Vientiane immediately declared the captain's brave death top secret and has not confirmed it since.

President Nixon's statement that "no American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations" is therefore incorrect.

Bush's death was not the only ground combat fatality in Laos. A half-dozen young Americans, working for USAID and international voluntary services, have been killed in ambushes since the Geneva accords of 1962. One of them, Don Sjustom of Seattle, Wash., was hit in the head and killed instantly during a North Vietnamese raid on a Lao army base called Nha Khang, north of the Plain of Jars, in January, 1968.

Sjustom, carrying a loaded shotgun for protection, was cut down as he tried to dash from the hut in which he had been sleeping to radio for help. As a refugee relief worker, he was not technically a combatant, but he did die in combat on the ground.

On Feb. 11, Bush and his sergeant helped coordinate ground action involving Thai artillery, U.S. air power and Lao infantrymen against a Communist force dug in on a road a few miles east of Muong Soui. After the day's action, the two retired to their own barbedwire compound at the Muong Soui military headquarters. The Thai artillerymen and their adviser were bivouacked on a hill about 20 minutes' walk away.

The midnight attack was a commando raid by a force of from 30 to 40 North Vietnamese soldiers armed with Soviet-made B-40 rockets and AK-47 automatic rifles. The first target was the Lao colonel's house, which collapsed in flames after a North Vietnamese tossed a hand grenade into an open window. The explosion wounded the colonel, his wife and 5-month-old son. His air force doctors saved the critically wounded infant.

After the grenade attack the enemy shot all four Lao guards and began spraying the

barbedwire enclosure with rocket and automatic weapons fire. "Smokes" said the hut in which he and Bush had been sleeping burst into flame in seconds.

The raid ended about 20 minutes after the first explosion. Twelve persons, including Bush, were dead, and 20 others, most of them Lao civilians who lived in huts around the compound, were wounded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

## THE MUSKIE PROPOSAL—A PRE-FABRICATED EXCUSE TO CUT AND RUN

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, the "let's cut and run in Vietnam" proposal is back with us again, only this time it is being couched in more subtle language than before.

Either that, or I have misinterpreted a recent speech by the junior Senator from Maine. In which case, I would be glad to have him set me straight.

Let me say first, however, that the Senator has put his proposition well and disguised it neatly with the statement that he believes a real end to the war can come only through negotiations. That point may or may not be valid. Suffice it to say that to date the North Vietnamese have shown little sign of wanting to negotiate on any realistic terms.

Largely, I suspect, because they have been encouraged, time after time, to believe that we will negotiate on their terms or, failing that, just plain cut out.

Certainly, these are the alternatives the Senator seems to be proposing, or, rather demanding. He tells the President he, and I quote, "must develop a proposal that is negotiable." That proposal he says is "a U.S. withdrawal timetable" coupled with "an informal arrangement regarding the withdrawal of North Vietnam forces."

Now there you have it. First we must work with the North Vietnamese and find for them a satisfactory time when we shall get out. In return, we get "an informal arrangement" regarding their withdrawal.

Mr. President, another President, a Democratic President, if you will, tried the same thing once before in Laos.

Except that in that case the North Vietnamese formally agreed to get out.

We now know what happened. We got out. The North Vietnamese did not. In fact, they now have 67,000 troops in that country. That fact shows how the North Vietnamese live up to their agreements.

Yet, the Senator from Maine would have us put our faith in them anyway. I respect his faith. But I fear it is misplaced.

Mr. President, perhaps another Member will stand up and tell me about the thousand-plus personnel we have in Laos and use that as an excuse for the North Vietnamese presence there.

Of course, there really is no comparison—for two reasons. One—we went back into Laos at the invitation of the lawful Laotian Government when it became obvious that the North Vietnamese would not leave. Two—67,000 troops with tanks and artillery is not quite the same

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as a thousand advisers and support personnel.

The Senator tells us that "there is some reason to believe that Hanoi would be receptive" to the negotiating approach he mentions. I am sure there is. But from their record, there is no reason to believe the North Vietnamese would live up to such an agreement should it be made.

The Senator must know this. Every thinking person in the country must know this. This is not the sure road to peace. This is just a prefabricated excuse to cut and run out on our commitments and on our allies.

Mr. President, as usual with those who put their trust in a foe who has an unbroken record of betrayals, the Senator seeks to put the onus on the back, not of the enemy, but of the American President, whomever he may be.

Again, I quote:

We have been in Paris for over a year and a half, and it is obvious that Hanoi finds no incentives for compromise in our present policy.

Our present policy?

Mr. President, every compromise proposal in Paris since the talks began has not been made, not by Hanoi but by Washington.

On May 14 and again on November 3 the President set forth our peace proposals. I quote:

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.

We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

We have offered free elections under international supervision with the communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. The Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

Mr. President, that is what the United States has proposed. And the President goes on to say:

We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side and that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.

What else could rightly be expected from the United States?

And yet the enemy, according to the Senator, finds no incentive to compromise.

I ask the Senator, "What is unreasonable about the President's approach?" I ask him, "What kind of incentives does he seek?"

I wish he could answer these questions or get the North Vietnamese to answer, because, as of last November 3, and I know of no change since then, Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms; that we withdraw all American Forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

How do I know this? President Nixon told us this on November 3.

Mr. President, it is obvious that there are those who would retreat from Vietnam at any cost. There are those who seem to seek to make Vietnam a political issue.

There are those who pretend that the massacres perpetrated by Ho Chi Minh after the partition of Vietnam did not happen. There are those who pretend that the atrocities at Hue—3,000 civilians shot and clubbed to death—did not happen.

There are those who ignore the effect of an American surrender in Vietnam on the peace of the rest of the world.

Fortunately for America and for the world the President of the United States is not one of those.

Fortunately for all of us the President has chosen a road to travel that freedom-loving people everywhere can live on and that the South Vietnamese will not have to die on.

It is a different road from the low-road to surrender or appeasement.

It is, instead, the highroad to an honorable and just peace.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, without waiving the right of the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT), I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## INFLATION ATTACKS EVERYBODY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, many people believe that this continuing inflation, that is, further depreciation of the value of the dollar, is affecting only the poor and lower middle class income brackets. That is far from true, however, and in this connection I ask unanimous consent that an article by Sylvia Porter in the Washington Star of March 5, entitled "Affluent 'Scraping By,' Too" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## AFFLUENT "SCRAPING BY," Too

(By Sylvia Porter)

A bright young executive with three children in the 12-16-year age range recently boasted that his family had adopted these money-saving measures:

Adjusted the engine on their fancy new foreign car to run on regular instead of high test gasoline.

Instructed the local druggist to cut by 20 percent the total of all prescriptions filled for the family.

Found a factory outlet store where the family can buy underwear at a saving of 20-50 percent.

Switched to trains for relatively short hops in which fares are considerably less than air fares.

Stopped home milk deliveries (at premium prices); started using cold water—plus special detergents in laundering to save on hot water; vowed to buy all ski equipment at bargain prices at season's end and all pool-purifying chemicals in bulk to save \$20 a year.

## ANGLES FASCINATING

Fascinating angles for saving, aren't they? And even more fascinating is the family,

for the executive is a \$40,000-a-year man—an income bracket occupied by less than 1/4 percent of U.S. households.

The plain fact is that the wealthier are feeling the pinch of climbing costs and soaring taxes at every level—federal, state and local—just as the less affluent are. True, they live on a more luxurious scale and are cutting costs on skiing, pools and high-test gas, but that doesn't make their pinch any less real to them. Here's the \$40,000 budget:

Item	Monthly cost	Yearly cost
Food, incidentals	\$750	\$9,000
Car depreciation and upkeep	120	1,440
School tuition, transportation	456	5,472
Home mortgage; improvement loan	400	4,800
All insurance	149	1,788
Medical and dental bills	125	1,500
Social security and pension contribution	100	1,200
Property taxes	120	1,440
Federal and State income taxes	1,030	12,360
Savings and miscellaneous	83	1,000

## THREE POINTS MADE

Immediately, three points out of this breakdown:

First, "school"—for three youngsters in private day school—is one of this family's biggest expenses. Reason: "The public schools in our area simply don't offer quality education." This family, like millions of others, pays increasingly steep school taxes—plus steep private tuitions. Private schooling is rapidly becoming a necessity rather than a luxury to many parents across the United States.

Second, all types of taxes, totaling \$13,800 a year, amount to 35 percent of the budget. The importance of taxes in today's middle-upper income squeeze cannot be exaggerated.

Third, the budget makes no special provision for the costs of vacations (this family has simply stopped taking them), restaurant eating, gifts, clothes. And the scant amount a month for savings also seems dangerously low to me—in view of the likelihood that three children soon will be entering college.

## OTHER PATHS TAKEN

In addition to finding exotic cost-cutting devices, what are upper-income families doing to ease the squeeze?

They're taking on more and more moonlighting jobs—in anything from teaching to consulting; demanding bigger and bigger raises; requesting transfers overseas where living costs are less; urging their wives to go back to work. Many, too, are simply using for day-to-day living the capital they have accumulated toward college costs or retirement.

How about simply cutting back living standards?

No, says the executive, despite his cost-cutting: "The big push instead is to find more sources of more income."

## BEYOND VIETNAM: PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in a brochure entitled "Beyond Vietnam: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," a report of the National Policy Panel established by the United Nations Association of the United States of America, a committee chaired by the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, under the subheading "Congress, Foreign Policy, and the Public," there are some interesting comments.

After detailing some of the things that have happened in recent years, this part of said report concludes with the following statement:

The democratic process is in danger of being warped by the seeming impotence of

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Congress in the foreign policy area. Apparent Congressional inattentiveness to the basic direction of American foreign policy has, all too often, denied the concerned citizen an important means through which he could relate in a direct and responsible manner to foreign policy decision-making. In particular the failure to develop procedures for the examination of the important agreements between the Executive and foreign governments is contributing seriously to an increase in the frustration of citizens concerned with foreign affairs.

I ask unanimous consent that this part of that report be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**BEYOND VIETNAM: PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY**

**CONGRESS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC**

The last thirty years have been a period of increasing Executive ascendancy over Congress. The very nature of contemporary foreign policy—its crisis-orientation, its heavy operational content, its premium on secrecy—all work to accentuate the role of the Executive in its formulation and execution.

During the last decade Congress in most instances has failed to serve as a strong source of examination and advice on the basic philosophy and direction of U.S. foreign policy or as a *post hoc* audit on the performance of the Executive Branch in the foreign policy arena. The major aspect of recent Congressional involvement in the foreign policy process has been limited, in the main, to attempts directed at intervening in the operational aspects of foreign policy. This typically has taken the form of amendments to the foreign aid appropriation directing the President to withhold aid from certain countries or to stop aid in the event that a country expropriates without compensation property owned by Americans.

There are a few examples of Congress attempting to explore and advise on the basic direction of American foreign policy. In 1966 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began to probe in public hearings the dimensions and implications of U.S. Asian policy. The Senate Government Operations Committee has probed the effectiveness of the national security policy machinery of the U.S. But these are largely exceptions to a general attitude of Congressional inattentiveness to the basic direction of U.S. foreign policy in the face of Executive ascendancy.

Congress particularly has failed to develop adequate procedures for examining the evolving nature of U.S. policy as expressed in agreements between the Executive Branch and foreign governments. The constitutionally sanctioned procedure of treaties once concluded being submitted to the Senate for their advice and consent largely has been bypassed by the nature and tempo of contemporary foreign relations. The recent Fulbright-Mansfield Senate Resolution regarding the manner in which our international commitments should be authorized is a late indicator that in this vital area of contemporary foreign affairs our constitutional and democratic processes for taking important decisions are in dispute and perhaps need revision. No agreed procedure has been found for subjecting to Congressional examination the numerous non-treaty agreements concluded between the Executive Branch and foreign governments.

As a result of this state of affairs a large and ill-defined proportion of U.S. foreign policy appears to have escaped the process of Congressional examination.

If agreements concluded solely by the Executive with a foreign government are later to be cited and accepted as controlling the course of U.S. foreign policy then Congress to a large extent appears to the concerned public to be irrelevant.

For the public this increasing tendency to conduct foreign policy by means of agreements concluded without the intervention of Congressional examination has meant the erection of an additional and highly effective barrier to citizen relationship to the process by which U.S. foreign policy is made. Congressional action on public policy issues raises it to a level of visibility where the opportunity for citizen concern becomes realizable. On the other hand, agreements between the Executive Branch and foreign governments, particularly if they are covert, provide little, if any, opportunity for the concerned citizen to express an informed opinion. If such agreements are to be later cited as the basis for additional U.S. action, one should not be surprised if the level of citizen frustration sharply increases.

The democratic process is in danger of being warped by the seeming impotence of Congress in the foreign policy area. Apparent Congressional inattentiveness to the basic direction of American foreign policy has, all too often, denied the concerned citizen an important means through which he could relate in a direct and responsible manner to foreign policy decision-making. In particular the failure to develop procedures for the examination of the important agreements between the Executive and foreign governments in contributing seriously to an increase in the frustration of citizens concerned with foreign affairs.

**CHARLES ALLEN THOMAS AND ECOLOGY**

**Mr. SYMINGTON.** Mr. President, in these days of pessimism about the environmental problems incident to ecology, it is refreshing to hear the words of a great expert in that field who is also one of the outstanding scientists and industrialists of our time.

Everybody in Missouri and other parts of this Nation is mighty proud of the record of Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, former head of the Monsanto Chemical Co. and recipient of the Priestley Medal, highest honor in his field.

I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch of Sunday, March 8, entitled "Technology Can Cure Social Ills, Says Monsanto's Charles Thomas" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**TECHNOLOGY CAN CURE SOCIAL ILLS, SAYS MONSANTO'S CHARLES THOMAS**

(By Curt Matthews)

Looking back on a 35-year career at Monsanto Co. that combined the excitement of scientific research with the satisfactions of corporate leadership, Charles Allen Thomas has but one regret.

"As the company got bigger and the organization more complex, I missed the daily contact—the give and take—with young people around the place," says the 69-year-old Thomas, a former president and chairman of the board of directors at Monsanto.

Thomas, who emerged as a nationally prominent scientist-executive at Monsanto at a time when this "new breed" of professional manager became the motivators that oriented American business toward innovation, saw positive "catalytic effects" in his relationship with younger scientists and managers.

"My personal contacts with young people I always looked upon as two-way streets—they gave me as much or more than I was able to give them," says Thomas who is retiring this month as a member of Monsanto's board of directors, his last official post with the company he joined in 1936 as a research chemist.

**YOUNG STIMULUS**

"It's a stimulating experience to talk with young people today," says Thomas noting that his role as chairman of Washington University's board of directors has been an avenue of close exposure—if not always close rapport—with youthful new attitudes. "We ought to devise some way for top executives to get away from their daily routines and engage more in the give and take with people throughout their companies. The output of such experiences would be very valuable."

Thomas believes that the current disengagement many young people express toward big business and the commercial uses of technology will soon be diminished as a result of newly developed relationships between technology and social good.

"Technology is going to rescue the social scientist," Thomas said last week the day before his participation in a science symposium named in his honor and focused on "Science, Engineering and the Quality of Life."

"The image that many young people today have of the technically oriented company is that it provides the tools of war," Thomas observed. "There is no question that modern warfare depends on technology. But so do the solutions to many of our most pressing social problems. When young people realize the potential in the relationships between technology and social good, they will be drawn back to the major companies with good technical resources."

**START AT GENERAL MOTORS**

Throughout a career that reached back to 1923 when he became a research chemist for General Motors Corp., Thomas has seen corporate research laboratories produce new products and technical approaches as a result of shifting needs of society.

It was during his employment at General Motors that Thomas developed the tetraethyl lead compound used in motor fuels to make engines run smoothly.

Later, after joining Monsanto, he was one of the principal scientists involved in development of processes to purify plutonium, an element essential to production of the atomic bomb in World War II.

Thomas believes that just as the chemical industry produced "knock-free" gasoline and atomic energy to meet social demands of a motoring public or a war-threatened America, the industry will find ways to provide solutions to social problems—particularly the problem of pollution.

"There is no other industry that you could name that is better positioned to deal with the problem of pollution than the chemical industry," Thomas notes. "Chemical operations are present in practically every aspect of pollution—air, water and solids."

Thomas, who has received numerous industry and academic awards throughout his career, including the highest award for achievement in American industrial chemistry in 1953 and the Priestley Medal, the highest honor given by the American Chemical Society in 1965, views the chemical industry as "the only industry capable of tapping the full spectrum of opportunity that exists today."

"I have to be bullish about the chemical industry and its role in the future of America," says Thomas. "It has always been the genius of the industry to come up with new approaches to old problems. With the possible exception of electronics, I can't think of another industry that can address itself directly to almost any area of social need and find a market."

**FATHER A MINISTER**

Charles Allen Thomas was born on a farm in Scott County, Kentucky, the son of a Disciples of Christ minister. An early interest in chemistry and a natural boyish curiosity produced the expected reaction and Thomas recalls that he "blew up things several times"

in the laboratory he assembled to conduct "basic" research.

At the age of 16, Thomas entered Transylvania College where he received a bachelor of arts degree in 1920. He went on to Massachusetts Institute of Technology and obtained a master of science degree in chemistry.

Thomas went to work for General Motors Research Corp. as a research chemist upon graduation from MIT. After helping with the development of tetraethyl lead compound for motor fuels, he joined the Ethyl Gasoline Corp. as a research chemist.

In 1926, Thomas combined his talents with those of an associate he met at General Motors, Carroll A. Hochwalt, and formed Thomas and Hochwalt Laboratories in Dayton, Ohio.

In 1936, Thomas & Hochwalt Laboratories was acquired by Monsanto and Thomas became the central research director at Monsanto and Hochwalt, who is now chairman of the St. Louis Research Council, was made associate director.

Thomas was elected to Monsanto's board of directors in 1942, was made executive vice president of the company five years later and in May, 1951, was elected president of the diversified international operation that today employs more than 64,000 persons.

He was chairman of the board from 1960 to 1965, when he was succeeded by Edward A. O'Neal, who served as chairman of the company until 1968.

Reflecting on the changes that have taken place at Monsanto since he joined the company in the depth of the Depression, Thomas notes, "Growth has been the most obvious change. When I started out, sales were only \$34,000,000 a year. In 1969 Monsanto approached the two billion dollar sales mark."

#### ATTITUDE CHANGED

There have been other changes in Thomas's 35 years with Monsanto:

"They used to think that money spent on research was money out the window.

"The emphasis in the early years was on production. Now it has shifted to marketing and corporate development."

Although research was considered "strictly overhead" when Thomas joined Monsanto, the company's attitude has evolved significantly in the intervening years. In 1969, Monsanto spent \$101,500,000 in research and development, up significantly from the \$86,300,000 outlay for R&D the previous year.

Thomas, who personally holds more than 85 United States and foreign patents, believes that despite lagging interest by investors in the chemical industry, this expenditure in research will eventually pay great dividends for the industry as a whole, Monsanto in particular and society in the long run.

"The chemical industry is in line for a great renaissance," Thomas said reflectively last week. "There are many opportunities ahead that the chemical industry is in line to meet. It will require some changes in outlook and in organization, but the rewards to the industry and to society will be exciting to witness."

#### PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, about 2,000 years ago, in 46 B.C., Julius Caesar was infuriated by chariot congestion in the streets of Rome. As a result, Caesar banned all wheeled vehicles from the streets during daylight hours.

Caesar was a dictator, which enabled him to fight Rome's environment problems with breathtaking directness. Of course, the fact that Caesar was a dictator did intolerable damage to the quality of life in Rome, damage much more insidious than traffic congestion could ever do.

If America were a dictatorship we could make some environmental improvements just by getting the dictator interested. But we are a democratic people, and we cannot act on a broad front in this fight until there is broad-based public support for the costly and often discomforting measures of environmental improvement.

The first step on the road to winning such broad-based support is to talk candid sense to the American people. Perhaps the way to begin talking sense is to explain why even a dictator could not achieve victory in the fight against pollution.

A dictator can be an awesome policeman. But it is quite wrong to think that environment problems call for nothing more than vigorous police action.

True, there are many areas in which we need more stringent laws curtailing or forbidding destructive activities. We need more laws with sharp teeth. But such steps—though necessary—are essentially negative. They require that people stop doing wrong. Hence, it is even more important that we learn how to do things right. This is a positive task. It requires the acquisition of new knowledge and technology. As a result, it is a more demanding task than the policing task of halting wrongdoing.

This positive task will require a creative partnership between government and the private sector. The private sector has great reservoirs of talent and inventiveness. The government can help elicit this.

The task of creative government is to devise incentive mechanisms that will encourage industry to turn its inventive genius, research talents and managerial techniques toward solution of the environmental problems that are directly and indirectly related to processes and products of industry.

We must then expect the private sector of the American economy to be as creative in helping solve environment problems as it has been in producing goods and services.

By the end of 1971 we may have the world's first trillion-dollar-a-year economy. As the gross national product grows, so does the inventive capacity of American industry.

There are now 570,000 scientists and engineers employed in research and development in America. Approximately 70 percent of them are in private industry.

Research and development expenditures by government and nongovernment sources were only \$5.2 billion in 1953. In 1970 they will be \$27.2 billion. This is \$1 billion more than last year, and \$7 billion more than in 1965. Almost half of this year's \$1 billion increase will go for research.

In 1970, Federal, State and local governments will provide 57 percent of all research and development funds. But industry will account for 70 percent of all research and development performance. This is made possible by the creative partnership between government and industry, whereby the Federal Government furnishes \$8.5 billion, or 44 percent of the research and development funds spent by industry.

But it is worth noting that industry today is furnishing a larger percentage of

the larger total of the research and development money it uses. In 1965 only 45 percent of such money came from industry's internal funds. Today the total is 56 percent.

The lesson we should learn is twofold. First, the fight against environmental decay is not just a government fight. The private sector has a vital role to play in the acquisition of necessary new knowledge.

Second, even where exercise of the police power is vital to solution of environment problems, we must avoid the tactics of confrontation. Any tactic which simply pits villains against victims is apt to be inappropriate. Environment problems involve complex processes and conflicts that are rarely simple collisions between two entirely separate interests.

This point has been made with exceptional clarity by Max Ways, an associate editor of Fortune magazine.

Writing in the special 40th anniversary issue of Fortune—February 1970—an issue devoted entirely to environment problems, Mr. Ways says:

Better handling of the environment is going to require lots of legal innovation to shape the integrative forums and regulatory bodies where our new-found environmental concerns may be given concrete reality. These new legal devices will extend all the way from treaties forbidding oil pollution on the high seas down to the minute concerns of local government. But the present wave of conservationist interest among lawyers and law students does not seem to be headed along that constructive path. Rather, it appears intent on multiplying two-party conflicts between "polluters" and victims.

When we read of some environmental atrocity—a sonic boom, a baby bitten in a rat-infested slum, a disease caused by polluted air—our sympathies instantly go out to the victims, just as our sympathies go out to those hurt in automobile accidents. This example should give us pause. The damage suit as a legal remedy in automobile accidents has clogged the courts and imposed on the public a \$7-billion annual bill for liability insurance premiums. This huge cost contributes almost nothing to highway safety. For a fraction of the dollars and the legal brains drained off by damage suits we could have produced better highway codes and better regulations for car safety—and also provided compensation for the victims of a diminished number of accidents. If environmental law follows the dismal pattern of accidents. If environmental law follows the dismal pattern of automobile tort cases, every business and perhaps every individual will be carrying insurance against pollution-damage suits. An army of pollution chasers, hot for those contingent fees, will join the present army of ambulance chasers. None of that is going to do the environment any good.

From the civilizational standpoint, the expansion of the law of torts was a magnificent advance over the blood-feud, the code duello, and the retaliatory horsewhip. But out of respect for this achievement of our ancestors we are not required to go on multiplying damage suits ad infinitum, while ignoring the need for new legal forms more relevant to the problems of our own time. This is not intended to suggest that environmental tort cases should have no place in future law. It is meant to express the hope that such suits will be exceptional and that the main line of legal development in respect to the environment will break (if conservationists can forgive the metaphor) new ground.

Mr. Ways' reference to conservationists raises another aspect of the problem

of thinking clearly about environmental problems. There is much confusion about the word "conservation."

If by "conservation" we mean just rigid preservation of the status quo in all of nature, then conservation is impossible and intolerable. Such a use of the word "conservation" would give the practice of conservation a bad name. Fortunately, there are more reasonable definitions of the word "conservation."

Milton M. Bryan, an official in the Forest Service, clarifies the matter when he says this:

I believe we need to be concerned about the fact that the term "conservation", which really means a wise and balanced use of resources, is often interpreted in the narrower sense of "preservation" which excludes timber cutting, wildlife harvest, managed watersheds and forage for livestock. Conservation can and should go hand-in-hand with the multiple uses that make a forest a more profitable and productive resource for all concerned.

This is an illustration of workable and prudent conservation. It accords with commonsense and the national interest.

We can illustrate what it means in practice by considering some problems relating to the national need for conservation and for development of resources in the field of forestry.

Sixty-seven years ago President Theodore Roosevelt declared:

The success of homemakers depends in the long run upon the wisdom with which the Nation takes care of its forests.

President Roosevelt understood that taking care of our forests involves more—much more—than just preserving existing forests. The fact about our demand for timber make it clear why the success of our economy as a whole is linked to sound forestry policies.

According to administration projections, we must build 26 million new homes in this decade. This means 2.6 million homes each year, a marked increase over the less than 1.5 million we averaged during the 1960's. Whether we will make this goal is uncertain. It depends upon many things, not least of all upon monetary policies. But if we are even going to come close we are going to need lumber in vast quantities.

Thus the idea of conservation that is applicable to forestry is a dynamic idea geared to meeting an ongoing and increasing demand for timber.

This demand is already huge.

In one year Americans use enough wood to build a boardwalk 10 feet wide and long enough to wrap around the earth 30 times at the equator.

Consider the appetite of just one member of one timber-using community, the publishing industry.

It takes 4,500 tons—9 million pounds—of newsprint to publish one Sunday edition of the New York Times. To produce that newsprint, it takes approximately 6,000 cords of wood. To get that wood might require the selective cutting of forest spruce from approximately 200 acres.

Now these statistics might cause some people to think that American forests are in mortal danger because of the Times pledge to publish "All the news that's fit to print." But it would be de-

pressing—and quite wrong—to think that we must choose between a vigorous press and flourishing forests. We should remember several things.

First, some of the wood—used in America is grown elsewhere. For example, much of our pulpwood comes from Canada.

Second, the growth and harvesting of pulp wood is legitimate forest use that in no way conflicts with a sensible conservation program. On the contrary, it is the essence of meaningful conservation, understood as the sensible use and re-newal of resources.

On the question of renewal of resources, there is another confusion that sometimes attaches itself to the word "conservation." Consider the matter of reclamation.

Mankind is not to blame for all pollution.

Soil erosion results in a form of water pollution, and nature inflicts this kind of pollution on itself with no help from man. Although, I might say that sometimes it gets too much help from us. As the President has noted:

The Missouri River was known as "Big Muddy" long before towns and industries were built on its banks.

Reclamation programs, began during President Theodore Roosevelt's administration, combat this natural environment problem.

Reclamation programs—including policies of sound soil and water use—do more than just restore balance to nature. They bring a balance to nature that nature never had before, and thereby improve whole regions and areas.

For example, without such reclamation the prosperous sun country of the American southwest would have an abundance of sun and shortages of most other things—including water, people and prosperity. Such programs, which go beyond mere preservation, are important conservation programs.

There is yet another sense in which reclamation programs are important for our national economic well-being. We can illustrate the point with reference to mining.

Currently there are 20,000 strip mines in America using more than 150,000 acres annually. But it is not true that the only way to avoid permanent scars or some other resulting evil is to stop all strip mining. In fact, State mine land reclamation laws, combined with Bureau of Land Management requirements, now insure that 90 percent of mining activity is covered by requirements regarding reclamation of used land. Thus our sensibly evolving mining policies recognize both the increasing national need for raw materials and the intensifying national interest in conservation of land. Here, again, we are using the word "conservation" to mean the sensible use of resources. Thus, when we speak of reclamation as part of the mining cycle, we are not saying that mined land must be restored to its original condition. Rather, we are saying that such land must be restored to usable condition—recognizing that many uses of land are compatible with a reasonable conservation program.

Twenty States have adopted mine land

reclamation laws which require that reclamation be treated as part of the mining cycle.

Such a policy recognizes that land reclaimed after mining may be most suited for a purpose entirely different than what it was suited for before mining took place.

If we were not able to correct the effects of mining, there might be substantial public pressure to sharply limit mining activities. Such pressure might have some unintended victims. Consider the following case.

In the early 1960's, thanks largely to the publicity attending the 1960 Democratic Party primary in West Virginia, the Nation became aware of the poverty-stricken condition of many residents of Appalachia. Poverty was especially acute among coal miners. By the beginning of the 1970's, the coal industry was doing much better. There was still poverty in Appalachia, and not all coal miners shared in the increased prosperity. But the well-publicized plight of Appalachia residents was improved, and that was a good thing.

The trouble is that the increased demand for coal, which increased employment and wages, also increased the scale of strip mining, especially in Kentucky. But we have not yet fully mastered techniques of strip mining without disrupting the local ecology. And expensive regulations on coal mining in all its forms might make coal less competitive as an energy source. Thus, we might protect the environment at a direct and severe cost to the long-suffering coal miners.

One thing should be clear. In our complex society, relationships between things and policies are often far more complex than we realize. Because of this, we in Government especially must become more alert to the fact that there are hidden policies in many fields.

A hidden policy exists when a policy designed for one social problem has important ramifications on another social problem.

Let me give an example. When transportation policy calls for building superhighways into cities, this is also a hidden housing policy, because highway construction in these instances is going to displace some residents.

There are probably more hidden environment policies than any other kind. Just as the environment is all around us, a government can hardly turn around without creating a hidden environment policy. When New York City recently raised its subway fares 50 percent without increasing tolls on the tunnels and bridges coming into the city, it was reasonable to expect that some people might drive to work rather than take the increasingly expensive subway. More driving means more exhaust fumes and more air pollution.

Such hidden connections between seemingly unrelated policies and problems can be dangerous if we are not alert. But they can be turned to advantage by skillful planning.

This planning should take advantage of what Roger Starr and James Carlson call cross-commitment.

Mr. Starr is executive director of the

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Citizen's Housing and Planning Council; Mr. Carlson is an economist for F. W. Dodge Co. They explain their strategy of cross-commitment in an intriguing essay in the Public Interest—winter 1968.

Cross-commitment is the policy of designing two programs which aim at different goals, but which interact in such a way that each promotes the achievement of the other program's goal.

Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson want to combine a clean waters program with an attack on poverty. This is how it would work in a program to eliminate combined sewer systems in major cities.

Combined sewer systems are systems that unite storm and sanitary sewers into a single system. Heavy rains often cause discharge of considerable raw sewage in water that is not processed by a treatment plant. Thus we could cut down on water pollution in and around cities if we could separate combined sewer systems into separate storm and sanitary systems.

This would be a clear environmental blessing to everyone. It would cost a great deal and Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson argue that this cost could be a blessing in disguise. They penetrate the disguise with an argument I will explain.

It is common now to separate sanitary and storm sewers in new subdivisions. But it might cost \$30 billion to separate them in older urban areas. Sample estimates are that it would cost \$160 per resident in Washington, D.C.; \$215 in Milwaukee; and \$280 in Concord, N.H.

Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson look upon this expense as a possible instance of crosscommitment between the wars against poverty and pollution. They speak somewhat jokingly about "the economic beauty of sewers" but the point they are making is very serious and what they say deserves quoting at length:

Of all the major types of construction activity, the one that requires one of the highest proportions of unskilled labor is the placement of sewage lines. Labor Department studies indicate that common laborers account for over 40 percent of all on-site man-hours involved in the construction of sewage lines. And on-site wages normally account for between one-fifth and one-fourth of the dollar value of a typical sewage-line contract. Adjusting for the fact that wage rates paid to laborers would be somewhat below the average for all employees on the job, the decision to undertake only the modest \$30 billion expense of complete separation of sanitary and storm sewers would result in direct wage payments of around \$2.5 billion to unskilled laborers. At an assumed annual wage of \$5,000, this could generate half a million man-years of employment. That's enough to provide jobs of one year's duration for three-fourths of all males in the nation who are currently unemployed for five weeks or more.

The point is: Aside from the tremendous benefits that such an undertaking would have in improving the nation's water resources, it could also be a formidable tool in any program bent on eradicating poverty.

Roughly twenty-five cents of every dollar spent on sewer lines or treatment plants goes for direct wage payments. But, more important, almost half of these wages go to unskilled or semi-skilled employees. If putting people to work and the value of the work experience is recognized as a necessary first step in acquiring job skills, then ex-

penditures for construction in this area, coupled with an active recruitment program of the unskilled unemployed, is a very efficient means of getting a lot of people to work in a relatively short space of time.

Mr. President, I feel compelled to add that while this material is used for the sake of illustrating the idea of cross-commitment, I must say personally that the one statement that \$30 billion would be a modest expense somewhat cools me off as a member of the Committee on Appropriations. But it also illustrates one thing in this entire environmental problem and that is that we are not going to solve these problems without spending a lot of money.

Mr. President, whether Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson are correct on this particular matter is a question that could only be settled by extensive and intensive investigation. But one thing is clear.

Their idea of cross-commitment is ingenious and intelligent. It should be examined by all of us as we prepare to embark on large-scale expenditures for environment improvement.

Our resources are limited. Our taxes are high. Our needs are many. Thus, if we can kill two birds with one stone—by attacking two problems or even more than two problems with one appropriation—we should do so.

Further, as we seek ways to implement the strategy of cross-commitment we will be alert to the existence of hidden environment policies, as well as to hidden policies in poverty, transportation, and many other areas.

Actually, we are already prepared to do this. The Cabinet Committee on the Environment, created in 1969, is coordinating departmental activities affecting the environment. This group should help us to be aware of hidden environment policies.

This will encourage clear thinking about environment problems and will enable us to get maximum mileage from our resources.

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order the Senate will proceed now to the consideration of routine morning business.

#### VIETNAM REPORT

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Americans should know that from January 1961 to March 1, 1970, in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos approximately 3,200 American warplanes have been destroyed and that during this same period more than 3,500 American helicopters have been destroyed.

Most of these were shot down by enemy action in and over South Vietnam. Some were destroyed on the ground by mortar fire. In the course of the bombing of North Vietnam many of our planes were destroyed by enemy fire before President Johnson stopped bombing north of the 17th parallel.

The results of our bombing targets in North Vietnam did not justify the losses of airmen and destruction of our planes.

This, particularly in view of meager damage done by our bombing, American taxpayers should know that the average cost of every airplane destroyed was \$2 million and the average cost of every helicopter was \$250,000.

This total destruction exceeds \$7.275 billion.

Recently in Laos newsmen who eluded our CIA operatives and walked nearly 10 miles through jungle trails observed American fighting men wearing civilian clothes. Even more important, they witnessed our B-52's flying from bases in Laos at 1-minute intervals. Since 1965 our bombers in Laos have hurled a greater tonnage of bombs than were hurled on North Vietnam throughout the entire period we were bombing north of the 17th parallel. It is estimated that our gigantic B-52's have not only bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos which extends from North Vietnam along the border of Cambodia and Laos, but we have bombed areas in Laos more than 200 miles distant from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. On these bombing missions which are said to approximate 6,000, our casualties, mostly in airmen killed and missing in combat, are more than 400. In addition approximately 300 have been wounded in Laos. In October 1965 when I was in that underdeveloped country for nearly 10 days our warplanes were disguised. In 1962 and in previous years we had guaranteed the neutrality of Laos. Regardless of that, when I was in every area of this underdeveloped country for several days in 1968 traveling by helicopter throughout the entire length and breadth of Laos I observed then that our warplanes were no longer disguised as I had observed in 1965. We had violated an agreement to maintain Laos as a neutral country in 1965, so we disguised our planes at that time. However, we were openly intervening in a civil war in that unhappy inhospitable land. Furthermore, literally hundreds of CIA operatives were all over the place, calling the shots and conducting the war that we were waging.

#### ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN N. MITCHELL'S PROPOSAL OUTRAGEOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, on reading the first page of the Washington Post of March 10, I was astonished to learn that John N. Mitchell, the Attorney General of the United States, stated that he would ask Congress to permit courts to order fingerprints, voice prints, blood tests, and other identification checks of suspects even before they are formally accused of any offense.

No doubt the Attorney General of the United States was a very skilled lawyer, but his specialty as a partner in the law firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander, and Mitchell, up until the time of his appointment as Attorney General, was passing on the merits of municipal bonds and tax-exempt bonds.

It is evident to me, as former chief prosecuting attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and as a lawyer who practiced law for more than 40 years in the courts of Ohio, the U.S. courts, and the courts of neighboring States, that At-

torney General Mitchell never tried a lawsuit in court in his entire career as a lawyer. Certainly, he does not know anything about criminal law.

Evidently the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Mitchell, would do very well to read the first 10 amendments to the Constitution of our country, adopted on the demand of those patriots who fought and won the War of Independence and who felt outraged when the first draft of the Constitution, which was drafted by 55 men in Philadelphia, was announced. The first 10 amendments were adopted upon their demand, because of the uproar from the homes of every patriot in colonial times.

In my opinion, Attorney General John N. Mitchell would be well advised to study the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments to the Constitution of our country, and then "cool it"—"cool it" a lot. He is advocating that a policeman, without any warrant whatever, be permitted to fingerprint and extract a blood sample from a man or woman accused or suspected of having committed a misdemeanor or some criminal action. This would include anyone taken in on a dragnet operation, in which hundreds of suspects are arrested.

The Attorney General's proposal would allow a policeman to go into the home of one suspected of committing a misdemeanor—driving while intoxicated, speeding, or anything else, then later place him in a lineup, with no charge against him, and have him fingerprinted. This proposal is offensive, unthinkable, and unconstitutional.

Then, under Attorney General Mitchell's program, a suspected person, not willing to go into a lineup or who would not permit a sample of his blood to be taken, could be brought before a judge, even though no charges have been brought against him, and punished for contempt of court.

Mr. President, no doubt this gentleman, in order to have become a partner in a great Wall Street law firm, must be a very well-educated and intellectual man. He might be a good man to be Secretary of Transportation, or in some less important administrative position, but very definitely he is lacking in knowledge of trial procedures.

Mr. President, in that connection, as chief criminal prosecuting attorney of Cuyahoga County for some years, I believed at that time, and very definitely I believe now, that certain punishment, like a shadow, should follow the commission of every act of violence against the laws of our country. We must at all times adhere to the guarantees giving complete civil rights and civil liberties to all Americans. These guarantees have been written into the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They must be respected.

The proposals made by the Attorney General deserve no consideration. When we read all his statements, we are led to wonder what sort of extremist we have as Attorney General. It is very unfortunate, Mr. President. We do not need new, oppressive, un-American laws. What we need in Washington, what we need in every city in the United States, are more and better law enforcement officers. The policemen are not entirely to blame. Sal-

aries of police officers and other law enforcement officers throughout the Nation should be increased, so that intelligent high school graduates will seek out law enforcement as a career.

In addition to that, in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, too many judges who are appointed and elected lack integrity and have backbones like jellyfish when it comes to imposing adequate and proper sentences on those who violate our laws.

So let us start with cleaning that up, instead of having the chief law enforcement officer of the entire Nation advocating stupid, unconstitutional practices.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired. Is there further morning business?

**S. 3579—INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW ENGLAND STATES FUEL OIL ACT OF 1970**

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide sorely needed relief to the citizens of our New England States, who are unfairly forced to pay artificially high prices for home heating fuel as a result of the mandatory oil import program. The bill is entitled the "New England States Fuel Oil Act of 1970." I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD in accordance with the Senator's request.

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, I represent a State and a region which depend almost entirely on home heating oil—commonly called "No. 2" home heating oil—to furnish heat during our severe winter months. Over 80 percent of the 11 million people living in New England depend upon oil burners for heating. Although we comprise 6 percent of the Nation's population, we consume 21 percent of all home heating oil consumed in the Nation. We have virtually no natural gas heating and relatively little electric heating. We depend on oil for approximately three-quarters of our total heating needs. Home heating oil is hardly a luxury item in the budget of New Englanders. It is a necessity vital to the health and well-being of the people.

An adequate supply of heating oil at a reasonable cost is, therefore, of crucial importance to the area.

Yet, Mr. President, New England residents are the captive victims of an unfair system which in recent years has resulted in critical shortages of No. 2 oil during the peak consumption winter months. And the prices which our homeowners must pay for heat are nothing short of outrageous. Retail prices for home heating oil are higher in New England than in any other region of the country. In 1968 New Englanders paid 9 percent more for No. 2 oil than the national average.

During the recent winter of 1969-70, Vermont suffered severe cold weather and snowstorms. The per capita heating

oil requirements rose, but the available supply declined.

Mr. President, why are the people of New England subjected to this intolerable and discriminatory burden? We are so severely disadvantaged that the need for relief fairly cries out, for in all good conscience the Congress cannot let this hardship persist for another winter if an answer to our plight can be found.

I believe a solution is available, Mr. President, in the bill I have introduced. Very simply, I propose a law to remedy the inequity arising out of the 1959 Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, which established mandatory oil import restrictions, by permitting the importation into the six-State New England region of all home heating fuel necessary to provide an adequate supply at a reasonable cost. My bill would not alter in any other way the existing quota restrictions.

Although my proposal is only part of the answer, it goes a long way because the mandatory import restrictions are the principal cause of the short supply and high cost of home heating oil in the Northeastern States. That this is so was borne out by the President's Cabinet task force report released last month. The task force determined that the nationwide cost we bear for restricting oil imports is \$5 billion. The eastern seaboard States bear the biggest share of this cost, paying \$2.1 billion more than they would if controls were lifted.

But even more startling, Mr. President, is the high cost to New England. Whereas the national per capita cost of import restrictions is \$24, Vermonters must pay an extra \$45; in Maine the figure is \$41; in New Hampshire, \$39. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table showing consumer costs in 1969 of the import program in different States be printed in the RECORD to accompany my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (Sec exhibit 1.)

Mr. PROUTY. Import controls, as they affect New England, create an obviously artificial and unnatural economic structure, whereby the area with the greatest market for home heating oil pays the highest price.

Why is New England singled out for such harsh treatment, Mr. President? The answer is simply that New England must depend entirely on heating oil produced in distant areas of the country and transported thousands of miles. Because of the import restrictions, we must use domestically produced oil, which at \$3.30 a barrel wellhead price exceeds the world market price of \$2 by over 30 percent. The New England region has no indigenous sources of crude oil, no oil refineries and no oil pipeline.

What New England needs, Mr. President, is not promises, not study committees and not makeshift solutions, but a rational solution now—in time for suppliers to obtain increased amounts of heating oil for the coming winter, which is only 7 months away.

Mr. President, I want to make it clear that I am not going so far as to propose at this time a total abolition of all import controls. Serious national security issues are at stake which must be care-

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 3827

There being no objection the commentary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY RIDICULES NIXON'S STATE OF THE WORLD MESSAGE

(Note.—Probably due to its length, President Nixon's "state of the world" message, delivered February 18, was not commented upon by the Peking regime until yesterday. When Peking did, its unyielding hostility toward President Nixon amid increasingly shrill attacks on the United States since the resumption of the Warsaw talks was plain for all to see. A New China News Agency commentary called the foreign policy report, officially entitled "United States Foreign Policy For the 1970s—A New Strategy For Peace", "a record of the over-all defeat of the U.S. imperialist's policy of aggression and self-revelation of the weakness, the waning and the drastic decline of U.S. imperialism." President Nixon's stress on "strength", "partnership" and "negotiation"—the so-called "Nixon Doctrine"—was seen as "a prescription made by him for U.S. imperialism which is sick to the core and in the grip of over-all political, economic and military crisis." The NANA commentary concentrated on the theme that the message only betrayed the weaknesses for the United States, using the term "paper tiger" at least four times. "The 'golden age' of U.S. imperialism . . . was but a fleeting phenomenon," it noted. "Since the disastrous defeat in its aggressive war against Korea, U.S. imperialism has rapidly fallen from its zenith." It then enumerated the "crises" facing the Americans, such as the Vietnam war, the "anti-imperialist struggle" of the Asian, African and Latin America people, and the financial and monetary crisis at home. The article did not forget to play the tune that "U.S. imperialism" is intensifying "its contention and collusion" with Soviet revisionist social-imperialism." Noting smugly that "Nixon has to admit to China's growing strength and her tremendous influence in the world," NCNA rapped the U.S. president for "talking hypocritically about his desire to improve 'relations' with China." "Nixon asserted blatantly that he wanted to maintain the treaty commitment with the Chiang Kai-Shek bandit gang," it said. "This has further exposed . . . the U.S. imperialism in its plot to occupy China's sacred territory Taiwan . . . and to create 'two China's'." It concluded that "the Nixon doctrine is nothing but a variation of the Truman doctrine, the Eisenhower doctrine and various other aggressive doctrines of U.S. imperialism under more clearly that the masters of the White House fare worse and worse from generation to generation." The NCNA commentary, entitled "New Strategy for Peace Cannot Save U.S. Imperialism From Fast Approaching Doom" and monitored in Taipei, is distributed here for the benefit of students of Chinese Communist affairs.)

PEKING, February 28.—U.S. imperialist chieftain Richard Nixon submitted to the U.S. Congress on February 18 a foreign policy report entitled "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s—A New Strategy for Peace."

This report is a record of the over-all defeat of the U.S. imperialist's policy of aggression and self-revelation of the weakness, the waning and the drastic decline of U.S. imperialism. It is another helpless confession of the U.S. imperialists that at the end of their rope, they are trying futilely to press ahead with their counterrevolutionary two-faced tactics.

Nixon packed his lengthy report with beautiful terms such as "peace", "new approach" and so on and so forth in an effort to disguise the ferocious and brutal U.S. imperialism as a peacock and cover up its aggressive and expansionist nature and the awful straits it is in.

In his report, Nixon put forth three "principles" and flaunted a tattered banner for his "new strategy for peace." The three

"principles" are "partnership", "strength" and "negotiation", the essence of which is to proceed from the position of "strength", carry forward the policy of aggression and war and step up the collusion and contention with social-imperialism to control the U.S. "allies" by establishing so-called "partnership" and press them to "share in the responsibility" of military aggression by U.S. imperialism and to serve as its cats-paw; and to use "negotiation" to cover up its schemes of aggression and expansion. These three "principles" are wrapped with a tattered banner of "peace." What has been brazenly lauded by Nixon as the so-called "Nixon doctrine" is in fact a prescription made by him for U.S. imperialism which is sick to the core and in the grip of over-all political, economic and military crisis, a prescription that is foredoomed to failure.

This prescription of Nixon's fully reflects the weakness of U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger and the awkward straits in which it finds its power failing far short of its ambition in pushing the counterrevolutionary global strategy. Indulging in reminiscences of the swashbuckling arrogance of U.S. imperialism in the early post-war years and thinking of the present, Nixon was seized with mournful nostalgia in his report. He recalled "American predominance" in the past when "the United States had a monopoly . . . of nuclear weapons" and has "taken such pride" in its "leadership" of the "free world" and "talked to our allies", but he had to admit that now "the world has dramatically changed", that "American energies were absorbed in coping with a cycle of recurrent crises" for more than 20 years and that "we will exhaust our resources, both physical and moral, in a futile effort to dominate our friends and forever isolate our enemies"; meanwhile, both Japan and the West European allies of the United States "have recovered their economic strength" and the struggle to control and the struggle to resist control between U.S. imperialism and these countries have been intensified, a great number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have won independence and become "a growing strength of independence"; and the nuclear monopoly of U.S. imperialism has also gone bankrupt.

"The golden age" of U.S. imperialism that Nixon yearns for so keenly was but a fleeting phenomenon. Since the disastrous defeat in its aggressive war against Korea in the early 1950s, U.S. imperialism has rapidly fallen from its "zenith." In the 1960s it has been badly battered again in its war of aggression against Vietnam and the crises besetting it at home and abroad have been greatly aggravated. The vigorously developing revolutionary armed struggle and anti-imperialist struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people and the surging revolutionary movement of the people of Western Europe, North America and Oceania are more than U.S. imperialism can cope with and make it sit on thorns. Its baton has become less and less effective toward its "allies" and it finds itself in unprecedented isolation, opposed by the masses and deserted by its followers. In the country, the financial and monetary crisis is daily deepening and the inflation is developing viciously, the position of the dollar is tottering and the economic crisis is getting more and more serious, the social system is rotten to the core and the class contradictions have sharpened to an extent never before seen. Nixon admitted himself that the "greatest increase in inflation and the latest social unrest" had taken place "in America in 100 years." U.S. imperialism is in what Nixon admitted to be "the most difficult time in history" and its financial and economic strength cannot provide "unlimited means" for it to carry out all its plans of aggression. In a word, U.S. imperialism has declined drastically; the paper tiger has been punctured all over. Nixon himself lamented that to continue

"the preponderant American influence . . . would be self-defeating." Therefore, he has to resort to political deception more and more to cover up the ambition of U.S. imperialism for military aggression and expansion. This is the very essence of Nixon's "new strategy for peace."

Nixon's report shows that though U.S. imperialism has been like the sun setting beyond the western hills, it will never give up its aggressive designs in the world and will make a deathbed struggle. U.S. imperialism is clearly a paper tiger badly battered by the people of the world, yet Nixon had the cheek to brag that the United States "occupies a special place in the world" and will continue to play a "major role" "because of its strength." He shouted himself hoarse that U.S. imperialism has "no intention of withdrawing from the world," and that it will "maintain current U.S. troop levels in Europe," "remain involved in Asia" and intensify the war of aggression against Vietnam by means of a "Vietnamization program." Moreover, it will step up its intervention in the Middle East and its penetration into Africa, further enslave Latin America and keep all its "treaty commitments" of aggression.

As U.S. imperialism is weak and on the decline with its strength unequal to its will, Nixon indicated in his report that in Europe, U.S. imperialism will use German revisionists as its hatchetman in the fight for domination over Western Europe and as its instrument for subversion in Eastern Europe. In Asia, it would make use of Japanese militarism, giving Japan "a unique and essential role to play". Nixon said: "Japan's partnership with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon doctrine in Asia." This is to say, U.S. imperialism wants to revive Japanese militarism energetically so that it will co-operate with U.S. imperialism in suppressing the Asian peoples' national liberation struggle, exploiting the independent countries in Asia and launching aggression against them, and carrying out counter-revolutionary criminal activities against China, against communism, and against the people. This should alert the people in the Asian countries to heighten vigilance.

In face of the aggression and expansion of the revisionist social-imperialism in various parts of the world, Nixon indicated in the report that U.S. imperialism would intensify its contention and collusion with Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. He said that since he came to power, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism have "made a good beginning" in their collusion with each other. However, he stressed that the U.S. "overall relationship with the U.S.S.R. remains far from satisfactory." He added that on the Middle-East question, Soviet revisionism wanted to seize a position in that area which would make great power rivalry more likely" so as to intensify its contention with U.S. imperialism. In East Europe, Nixon demanded that Soviet revisionism "improve situation regarding Berlin" and "normalize its own relations with Eastern Europe." In his report, Nixon made no effort to hide the U.S. imperialist ambition to penetrate into Eastern Europe and to contend with Soviet revisionism for control over Eastern Europe. Nixon openly declared that U.S. imperialism will maintain "a level of involvement sufficient to balance the powerful military position of the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe" and that it will engage in a still more frenzied nuclear arms race with Soviet revisionist social-imperialism so as to avoid losing its "leading" position in the nuclear field.

In his report, Nixon has to admit to China's growing strength and her tremendous influence in the world. He expressed apprehensions over the fact that "China has acquired thermonuclear weapons" and had thus broken the U.S. and Soviet nuclear monopoly.

While talking hypocritically about his desire to improve "relations" with China, Nixon asserted blatantly that he wanted to "maintain" the "treaty commitment" with the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang in Taiwan. This has further exposed the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism in its plot to occupy China's sacred territory Taiwan permanently, exposed its criminal scheme to create "two Chinas" and also expose its feeble nature as a paper tiger.

Juggling right and left with the word "peace", Nixon said in his report that few ideas have been "so often or so loosely invoked as that of peace". However, it is precisely U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism which have loosely invoked the word "peace". To put it bluntly, the word "peace" in the mouth of Nixon is "peace" for U.S. imperialism to forcibly occupy the world, to suppress the people's revolutionary struggle in all countries and to plunder and slaughter the people of various countries at will. It is "peace" for U.S. imperialism to have its allies act according to its dictate and to have its satellites continue to be enslaved. It is also "peace" for U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism to collude and contend with each other for world domination and for redividing the world.

What is both ridiculous and pitiable is that Nixon himself had to come out and glorify his own report. He smugly asserted that his report had taken "a full year in preparation", that "the report is the first of its kind ever made by a president", that it is "historic" and "marks a watershed in American foreign policy" and so on and so forth. He sounded as if he had really found a panacea for U.S. imperialism which is sick to the core. But contrary to his self-glorification, even the Western press has reacted coldly, saying scornfully and sarcastically that "with its ordinary absence of substance, given its length", the report is empty and "relates nothing that is new and little that is specific" and that it "raised more questions than it answered". The Western press comments also pointed out that the report "left American foreign policy broadly unchanged", a policy that "essentially remains to be diplomacy from the position of strength." The only significant point in the report is that it has "proclaimed an end to the era of post-war American domination". Indeed, the "dominant position" of U.S. imperialism, which rots with every passing day, is gone forever.

The great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The imperialist system is riddled with insuperable internal contradictions, and therefore the imperialists are plunged into deep gloom." The emergence of the "Nixon doctrine" precisely reflects the deep gloom of the U.S. imperialists who are declining drastically and are at the end of their rope. The "Nixon doctrine" is nothing but a variation of the "Truman doctrine", the "Eisenhower doctrine" and various other aggressive doctrines of U.S. imperialism under new circumstances and a new situation. It reflects still more clearly that the masters of the White House fare worse and worse from generation to generation. Ours is an era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. No matter what kind of "doctrine" U.S. imperialism dishes up and what new labels it puts up, none of them can save it from complete destruction.

#### LAND REFORM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MAGNUSEN. Mr. President, a very important matter occurred in the news yesterday morning, and its importance deserved much more space than it was given. That matter was the passage of the land reform program by the House of Representatives of South Vietnam. It is probably the most important story

about winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people in years, and I think the most important nonmilitary event to occur in Vietnam since American involvement began.

Much of the credit in initiating this measure should go to Prof. Roy Prosterman from the University of Washington law faculty. Professor Prosterman made numerous trips to South Vietnam and Washington, D.C., to argue the merits of land reform to public officials and to State Department officials. His efforts have been very substantial.

The significance of land reform is this:

About 1 million South Vietnamese families, or more than 6 million people out of the country's total population of 17 million, have been dependent for years and years for their living on tenant farming, carried out under the most onerous conditions. They form a vast majority of the rural population, and they have been an easy mark for the Communists because of their discontent. Now these 6 million people are to be the beneficiaries of the largest scale democratic land reform program of this century: bigger than similar programs embarked upon previously by Japan, South Korea, or Mexico.

Of course, this is the way to win the hearts and minds of people. This is good news for all the American people, and it is the result of what we hoped for when we introduced Senate Resolution 290, which suggested that land reform be enacted as soon as possible.

The South Vietnamese Legislature has now given final approval to the land reform bill and it has been sent to President Thieu for his signature. I hope now it will be administered properly and funded adequately by AID officials.

I read as follows from a dispatch in today's Wall Street Journal. I know Senators will be interested in this:

In Saigon, the national assembly passed and sent to President Thieu a land-reform bill designed to make every peasant owner of the land he farms. Vietcong propagandists have been able to stir discontent in the countryside by capitalizing on the landlord situation. The bill provides that a landlord can retain all the land he personally tills, up to 37 acres. He will be compensated for the rest, which the government will take over for redistribution.

This is a dramatic step and one that will give peasant farmers a "piece of the action" without onerous rents.

I again want to stress the great amount of work done by Professor Prosterman from the University of Washington. Two Presidents were urged to do what they could about beginning this kind of land reform in Vietnam. Other Senators joined me in sponsoring Senate Resolution 290 and in sending letters to the President on this important issue—their support was greatly appreciated.

I think this is very bright news from South Vietnam—if the government will now administer the program vigorously and carry it out as written. We should make great progress with the peasant farmers. Much of the credit for this result relates to the interest and awareness of Members of the Senate to this critical issue.

#### MEMORIAL TO DR. ROBERT H. GODDARD, FATHER OF AMERICAN ROCKETRY

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, on Monday, March 16, the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences conducted a hearing on Senate Concurrent Resolution 49, providing for congressional recognition of the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum at Roswell, N. Mex., as a fitting memorial to Dr. Robert H. Goddard, known as the "father of American rocketry." During the course of the hearing, tributes were paid to Dr. Goddard by associates and other Government witnesses for his outstanding contributions to rocketry.

One of these witnesses was Mrs. Robert H. Goddard, widow of Dr. Goddard, who was not only a devoted wife, but an active assistant in his work from the time they were married in 1924 until his untimely death in 1945.

Another witness was Dr. Charles Greeley Abbot, Secretary emeritus of the Smithsonian, who on May 31, 1970, will celebrate his 98th birthday. Dr. Abbot was a close personal friend and a strong supporter of Dr. Goddard's work while serving as Assistant Secretary and Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. Dr. Abbot retired in 1944 but has continued his work in astrophysics, in which he is an acknowledged expert, and still makes frequent trips to the Smithsonian Institution where he maintains an office.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statements of Mrs. Goddard and Dr. Abbot be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. I urge Senators to read about this remarkable man. To quote Dr. Thomas O. Paine, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, who also appeared before the committee in connection with Senate Concurrent Resolution 49:

Americans can ill afford to ignore the contributions of Robert H. Goddard in the history of the coming of the space age. Young Americans need to appreciate that what appear as unsolvable problems today are not new to man's experience. Dr. Robert H. Goddard's rocket artifacts and his lifelong labors should be an inspiration to each generation of youth as they grapple with the concerns of their day and their dreams of a better world of their tomorrows in a dynamic universe. This Nation cannot afford not to have Robert H. Goddard in the future.

There being no objection the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### MRS. GODDARD'S STATEMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am happy to make a short personal statement in support of Senate Concurrent Resolution 49, which proposes that the Congress recognize the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum and Art Center at Roswell, New Mexico, to be read at the Senate hearing on Monday, March 16.

Forty-four years ago, today, on a small farm in Auburn, Massachusetts, a small rocket took flight. It was an unusual rocket, because it used, for the first time in the world, liquid propellants more powerful than any others thus far developed. For a quiet professor at Clark University, in nearby Worcester, this flight was the culmination of a childhood dream and a ten-year laboratory quest. In 1914, after Robert Goddard